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THE STATE OF NEW YORK DOES EXIST: HOW
THE STATES CONTROL COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
JULIAN

G. KU*

Although most courts and commentators presume that the states
disappearwhen it comes to foreign relations,states actually play a
crucial role in fulfilling U.S. obligations under internationallaw.
In many circumstances, state governments are the only institutions
responsible for carrying out treaty and customary international
law obligations on behalf of the United States. Not only have
states always played this role, but state control over the
implementation of such obligations is likely to become even more
important in the future because the implementation of many
private internationallaw and internationalhuman rights treaties is
controlled by the states. This role for states in controlling
compliance with international law calls into question the widely
held view that exclusive federal control over foreign relations is
required or desirable. This Article suggests state-controlled
implementation could actually bolster the development of
internationallaw.
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INTRODUCTION

In respect of all international negotiations and compacts,
and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does
not exist.'
The Supreme Court famously exterminated New York and the
other states of the Union with respect to foreign affairs in 1937,2 and,
until recently, few courts and commentators have mourned their
extinction. Doctrines such as the dormant preemption of state
activity in foreign affairs; 3 customary international law as federal
common law4 and therefore "supreme over the law of the several
States";5 and the federal government's freedom to make international
law through treaties and other international agreements

1. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
2. Belmont is only the most colorful example of this view of the states. See, e.g.,
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)
("For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes,
embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one
power."); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840) ("It was one of the main
objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one
people, and one nation .... ").
3. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2387-88 (2003); Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
4. Customary international law (also referred to as the law of nations) results from
the practice and beliefs of nations. Treaties form international law based upon binding
agreements between nations. Under international law, treaties are any sort of binding
agreement, but under U.S. law, treaties refer to agreements made by the President and
ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD:
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 101-103 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (defining international agreements and discussing the scope of
their authority in the United States); MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUcTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 41-55 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing customary international law).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630

F.2d 876, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1980) (ruling that U.S. courts are bound by the "law of nations");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111 cmt. d ("[C]ustomary international law, while
not mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy Clause, [i]s also federal law and as such [is]
supreme

over

State law.");

LOUIS

HENKIN,

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

AND THE

U.S.

CONSTITUTION 238-39 (2d ed. 1996) (same); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1824-27 (1998) (defending status of
customary international law as federal law). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 816-22 (1997)

(arguing that customary

international law as federal common law is a "modern" view with no doctrinal or historical
justification).
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unconstrained by federalism and state's rights, reflect a strong

academic and judicial consensus against state involvement
in any
6
matters related to foreign affairs and international law.
These various strands of the "nationalist conception" share the
same premise: states do not, and should not, have any independent
role in matters relating to foreign affairs.7 Although a recent wave of

"revisionist" scholarship has questioned elements of the nationalist
view, the intuitive appeal of the nationalist view remains compelling
to many scholars, particularly with respect to compliance with
international law obligations.' If states can control how and even
whether the United States will comply with its international law
obligations, scholars have argued, then it will fail to maintain "one
voice" with respect to foreign affairs.9 Such a system would be

6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, §§ 302, 303; Gerald L. Neuman, The
Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33, 46 (1997); see also HENKIN,
supra note 5, at 191 ("Many matters, then, may appear to be 'reserved to the States' as
regards domestic legislation if Congress does not have power to regulate them; but they
are not reserved to the states so as to exclude their regulation by international
agreement." (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920))); Lori Fisler
Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "NonSelf-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 530 (1991) ("[T]he treaty makers may
make supreme law binding on the states as to any subject, and notions of states' rights
should not be asserted as impediments to the full implementation of treaty obligations.").
7. See discussion infra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
8. A recent wave of "revisionist" scholarship has initiated a lively scholarly debate
over the nationalist view of international law with respect to both treaties and customary
international law. "Nationalist" scholars tend to view federal control over all international
law as constitutionally required. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 5, at 238-39 (observing that
"it is established that [customary] international law is law of the United States" for
purposes of federal court subject matter jurisdiction under Article III and for purposes of
supremacy over state law in Article VI); Damrosch, supra note 6, at 530 (arguing that the
treaty power is unlimited by federalism or states' rights). On the other hand, "revisionist"
scholars have suggested that federal control is improper. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 5, at 816-22 (arguing that customary international law is not a source of federal
law and that treating it as such could threaten traditional domestic lawmaking processes);
A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Law Cases, 20 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 8-14 (1995) (arguing that federal court cases incorporating customary
international law as federal common law are wrongly decided). Moreover, in the case of
the treaty power, the revisionists argue that federalism principles act to limit the scope of
the federal power so that some treaty obligations must be implemented by states. See, e.g.,
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390,
456-61 (1998) (arguing that the "nationalist" view of treaty power unlimited by federalism
should be reconsidered); Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty
Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403, 533 (2003) (arguing that limited federalism restrictions
constrain the treaty power).
9. Koh, supra note 5, at 1850 (arguing for the "one voice" rationale); see also
HENKIN, supra note 5,at 238-39 (noting that "[f]ifty states could have fifty different views
on some issue of international law and the federal courts might have still another view");
Damrosch, supra note 6, at 530 (noting problems that arise during the Senate's ratification
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"bizarre"'" and "strikingly irresponsible."1 1
Bizarre and irresponsible as it may seem, this Article argues that,
in many circumstances, the states already control how and whether
the United States will comply with certain obligations under
international law. Not only are states often responsible for the
integration and development of customary international law, but
states are also often solely responsible for implementing U.S.
obligations under many international treaties.
This Article does not claim that a system of state control over
compliance with international law is constitutionally required, due to,
for instance, limitations on the ability of the federal government to
legislate via the Treaty Clause. In many instances, the federal
government may choose to leave control over international law to the
states. It is equally plausible, however, that federal policymakers
have avoided exploring the limits of their constitutional powers over
the states by deferring to state control over international law. In any
case, the existence of this system strongly supports the constitutional
legitimacy of a robust and independent state role in fulfilling
international law obligations, and perhaps even participating in
foreign relations.
States control compliance with international law in a number of
ways. State governments often fulfill U.S. responsibilities under both
customary international law and treaties, even self-executing
State courts have independently developed and
treaties.12
incorporated doctrines of customary international law, 3 and state
legislatures have implemented international law obligations through
legislation. 4 When the federal government ratifies a treaty or
declares adherence to a norm of customary international law that
implicates state functions or interests, state governors are responsible
for implementing those treaty obligations.15
of treaties when states have pre-existing inconsistent statutes on the same subject matter).
10. See Koh, supra note 5, at 1850 (describing as "bizarre" the view that customary
international law is not federal law).
11. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The HistoricalFoundations
of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1312 (2000)

(describing the view that states would have enough independent control to implement
treaty obligations as "strikingly irresponsible").
12. See discussion infra notes 221-47 and accompanying text.
13. See Julian G. Ku, Customary InternationalLaw in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.

265, 291-333 (2001) (describing how customary international law doctrines of diplomatic
immunity in transit, extradition, and sovereign immunity were introduced and developed
by state courts free of federal court review).
14. See discussion infra notes 248-67 and accompanying text.

15. See discussion infra notes 268-314 and accompanying text.
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In the modern era, the most important role for the states in
compliance with international law obligations stems from their ability
to implement certain treaties, particularly "non-self-executing"
treaties. Non-self-executing treaties do not have an immediate effect
on the domestic laws of the United States.16 Rather, some institution,
typically Congress, must pass implementing legislation to fulfill U.S.
obligations under that treaty. Where Congress has failed to take this
action (or believes it unnecessary), the states are responsible for
carrying out those treaty obligations, usually through legislation.
Moreover, where the treaty-makers (meaning the President and the
Senate) choose to limit the treaty's effects on the states by means of a
reservation, Congress may be limited from passing implementing
legislation that would override state law. In these circumstances, the
states, and not the federal government, control whether and how to
implement a treaty obligation of the United States.
The response by the United States to a series of International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") orders requiring the suspension of state
executions of foreign nationals provides a recent example of how a
state can control compliance with international law.17 In those cases,
the U.S. government argued to the ICJ that because the United States
is "a federal republic of divided powers... [f]ederal [g]overnment
officials do not have the legal power to stop [a state action]
peremptorily," even when a serious breach of an international
obligation might occur as a result of that state action.18 Thus,
according to the federal government itself, the states are free to
decide whether to carry out treaty obligations embodied in the ICJ
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111(4); id. § 111(4) cmt. h. For a
careful and detailed discussion of the various rationales for non-self-execution, see David
Sloss, Non Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a ConstitutionalFallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 1-44 (2002).

17. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)
(Provisional Measures Order of Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Avena Provisional Measures
Order], http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imusiorder_20030205.pdf
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.)(Judgment
of June 27, 2001) [hereinafter LaGrand Judgment], http://www.icj-cij.org.icjwww/idocket/
igus/igusframe.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Case Concerning the
Vienna Convention of Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) (Provisional Measures Order of
April 9, 1998), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (April 9) [hereinafter Breard Provisional Measures Order],
available
at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm,
withdrawn, Discontinuance Order of Nov. 10, 1998, 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm.
18. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (F.R.G. v. U.S.), paras. 12124 (Mar. 27, 2000), [hereinafter LaGrand U.S. Counter-Memorial], http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguspleadings/iGUS-ipleading-CounterMemorial US_200003
27.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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orders to suspend state executions.' 9
Leaving implementation of the ICJ orders to the states'
discretion is not, as some scholars have suggested, a mere anomaly
reflecting the politics surrounding the death penalty.2 ° States have
consistently fulfilled other kinds of international obligations that have
intersected with areas of traditional state legislative authority. For
example, states have played a central role in compliance with treaty
and customary international law obligations affecting probate
proceedings, local property and gasoline tax immunities, injuries to
alien residents, notaries, family law, commercial law, and other areas.
In sum, states play a much more significant and substantial role in the
implementation of international law obligations than most
commentators have recognized or endorsed 2 1
This unlikely role for states in the implementation of
international obligations is only likely to increase in importance. At
present, states play a leading role in the implementation of a number
of important private international law conventions, which have
increasingly been implemented via the "Model Code" system.22
19. Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214 (A-732)) [hereinafter Breard Amicus Curiae Brief]
("[O]ur federal system imposes limits on the federal government's ability to interfere with
the criminal justice systems of the States. The 'measures at [the United States']
disposal'.. . may in some cases include only persuasion .. " (quoting Breard Provisional
Measures Order, supra note 17, 1998 I.C.J. at 258))).
20. See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, The Constitutional Authority of the Federal
Government in State Criminal Proceedingsthat Involve U.S. Treaty Obligations or Affect
U.S. Foreign Relations, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-13 (1999) (arguing that the
U.S. government's failure to prevent Breard's execution was a matter of policy, since it
would be "unthinkable" for the federal government to lack the constitutional power to
compel Virginia's compliance with an ICJ order); Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures,
U.S. Treaty Obligations,and the States, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 679, 681 (1998) (arguing that
federal government had a legal obligation to make Virginia obey the ICJ's decision in
Breard); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance
with ICJ Orders of ProvisionalMeasures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683, 690 (1998) (arguing that
the U.N. Charter gave President Clinton the authority "to issue an executive order
postponing Breard's execution").
21. Professor Henkin has noted the role of states in the implementation of
international treaties, see HENKIN, supra note 5, at 150-51, but he generally limits the role
of states to their political influence and endorses the nationalist view of federal control
over customary international law and the treaty power. See id. at 150-51, 191, 238-39.
22. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL"), a private organization, promulgates model codes in a variety of private law
areas for adoption by state legislatures. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The
Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 601-03 (1995)
(describing structure and purpose of NCCUSL). For a discussion of "international private
lawmakers" analogous to the NCCUSL, see generally Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and
International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681
(1997).
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Additionally, the states hold the power to implement various
important treaty obligations, including all of the major international
human rights treaties.23 Furthermore, states have also been granted
special protections in the implementation of international trade
agreements. 4 In the future, as international treaties begin to regulate
activities previously considered within the traditional jurisdiction of
the states, treaties that result in state control over international law
obligations will likely become more commonplace.
The continued existence and even expansion of a system of state
control over compliance with international law obligations has at least
two important implications. First, the states' role in guaranteeing
compliance with international law obligations calls into question the
oft-quoted view that the states "do not exist" with respect to foreign
affairs and that the principle of maintaining "one voice" in foreign
affairs overrides state interests. At least with respect to compliance
with international law obligations, the states will continue to have a
central, and sometimes independent, role. Moreover, the U.S. system
has tolerated, and will likely continue to tolerate, inconsistencies
between levels of state compliance with international law that hardly
suggests a constitutional imperative for speaking with "one voice" in
foreign affairs. Whether or not this account of state control heralds
the rise of the states as "demi-sovereigns" on the world stage,26 there
seems little doubt that courts and commentators have exaggerated the
imperative of excluding states entirely from matters involving foreign
affairs.
Second, although some international law scholars and advocates
have suggested that state control would result in little or no
compliance with international law,27 the present system could actually
foster more, rather than less, development of international law within
the United States. A clear understanding by institutional actors that
state autonomy can be preserved simultaneously with the

23. See infra notes 315-33 and accompanying text.
24. See Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) (2000)
(barring anyone other than the United States from challenging U.S. or state action or
inaction based on its consistency with the Uruguay Round Agreements); Uruguay Round
Agreements Act: Statement of Administrative Action, H. R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 67577, 1043-44 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4054-56, 4327 (Y1.1/7: 103-316).

25. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 402-09 (describing treaties that could conflict with
state regulation of commercial law, criminal procedure, and environmental protection).
26. Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA.
J. INT'L L. 121,161-78 (1997).

27. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 5, at 1828 (suggesting that turning over customary
international law to states would result in no international law at all).
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development of international law may reduce political opposition to
the United States' entry into new international treaties, especially
those involving international human rights.2 8 Advocates for the
implementation of certain international law obligations may take
their case to individual states, some of which may be significantly
more receptive to their arguments than the United States Congress. 9
Indeed, states, and not the federal government, could actually
participate in the process of "creating" norms of customary
international law.30
Part I of this Article describes the nationalist conception of
foreign affairs and international law, and the revisionist critique. It
also explains how state control over international law undercuts the
historic and functional basis for the nationalist conception. Part II
describes the history of state control over international law
obligations. Part III reviews the contemporary manifestation of this
system of state control and argues that the modern scope of
international law makes it likely that states will wield even greater
influence over the implementation of international law in the future.
Finally, Part IV examines the policy implications of the system
described.
I. THE NATIONALIST CONCEPTION AND THE REVISIONIST
CRITIQUE

The notion that state governments can and should play an
important and substantial role in the incorporation and
implementation of international law may strike the casual observer as
odd or implausible. The main reason for this lack of intuitive appeal
is that many courts and commentators have endorsed a nationalist
conception excluding states from all aspects of foreign affairs,
including the incorporation and implementation of international law.
This Part provides an overview of the doctrinal elements of the
nationalist conception of both foreign affairs and international law,
and the scholarly debate over these doctrines. The system of state
28. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
ConditionalConsent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 457-64 (2000).
29. See infra notes 243 and 373-93 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley, California World War H Compensation and Foreign Relations Federalism, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 282, 283-90 (2002) (suggesting progressive international human
rights could develop through state-level litigation).
Constitutional Possibilities for
30. Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism:
Incorporationof Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 245-55,
262-95 (2001) (describing virtues of state involvement in development of international
human rights norms); Spiro, supra note 26, at 161-74.
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control over international law described in this Article strengthens
both the historical and functional foundations of the revisionist
critique.
A.

The Nationalist Conception of ForeignAffairs

The United States Supreme Court has often endorsed a
nationalist conception that assumes the exclusion of states from any
activities relating to foreign affairs. As early as 1840, the Court
explained while evaluating a state extradition statute that "[i]t was
one of the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as
regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation .... ""
This theme was elaborated upon in decisions invalidating state
regulation of immigration when Justice Miller argued that "a silly, an
obstinate, or a wicked [state] commissioner may bring disgrace upon
the whole country, the enmity of a powerful nation, or the loss of an
equally powerful friend."32
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court reiterated this
conception in Chae Chan Ping v. United States.33 Although the case
did not involve a state statute,34 the Court took the opportunity to
expound upon its conception of an exclusive federal control over
foreign affairs:
The control of local matters being left to local authorities, and
national matters being entrusted to the government of the
Union, the problem of free institutions existing over a widely
extended country... has been happily solved. For local
interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national
purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are
but one people, one nation, one power.35
These kinds of broad declarations were often not necessary to
the holdings of those cases,3 6 which usually relied on a specific
constitutional provision, federal statute, or executive agreement
rather than on a generalized federal power over foreign affairs hinted

31. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840).
32. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275,279 (1875).
33.

130 U.S. 581 (1889).

34. Chae Chan Ping involved a challenge to the validity of a federal statute excluding
Chinese immigrants that conflicted with a treaty obligation with China. The Court held
that an act of Congress can supersede an earlier treaty. See id. at 603.
35. Id. at 605-06.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317-33
(1936) (holding that the delegation of power to the President to impose arms sanctions
was constitutional and not considering any state law).
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at in these opinions.37 Thus, even though it eventually declared that
the state of New York, and therefore all states, "did not exist,"
implying a broad presumption of federal exclusivity over foreign
affairs, the Court has generally relied on Congress or the President to
actually override state activities through statute, treaty, or executive
agreement.38
In the 1969 case of Zschernig v. Miller, however, the Court
departed from this approach and invalidated a state law prohibiting

inheritance by foreign nationals in communist countries.3 9 It held that
the statute was a violation of the federal government's exclusive
control over foreign affairs, even where there appeared to be no
conflict with federal statutes and even where the President filed an

amicus brief disavowing any conflict with foreign policy. 0

Thus,

although the states "have traditionally regulated the descent and
distribution of estates.... [t]hose regulations must give way if they
impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy."'"
Zschernig, therefore, announced openly what the Court had only
suggested in its previous holdings: not only are Congress and the
President authorized to override state activities that interfere with
foreign affairs, but the states are excluded from any such activities
even in the absence of congressional or executive action.42 Although
the lower courts have applied Zschernig sparingly, 3 the Supreme
Court recently relied on Zschernig to invalidate a California statute
forcing European insurance companies to disclose information about

37. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (relying on constitutional
provisions granting federal government authority over interstate commerce and
naturalization to invalidate state immigration law); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
540, 547-51 (1840) (relying on constitutional prohibition on state treaty-making to
invalidate extradition).
38. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (relying on federal statutes
governing alien registration to preempt state registration statute); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937) (relying on executive agreement to preempt
inconsistent state law).
39. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968).
40. Id. at 440.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 431.
43. See, e.g., Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1377 (D.N.M. 1980)
(preempting state university's denial of admission to Iranian students on foreign affairs
grounds); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1969) (preempting state buy-American statute on foreign affairs
grounds); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 305 (I11.
1986)
(preempting state expulsion of South Africa from currency list); New York Times v. City
of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 968-69 (N.Y. 1977) (preempting
cities' ban on South African employment advertising).
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The Court found that even

though no specific federal statute or executive agreement conflicted
with the California statute, the state law was invalid because it
" 'compromise[d] the very capacity of the President to speak for the
Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments' to resolve
claims against European companies arising out of World War II."'
B.

The Nationalist Conceptionof InternationalLaw

A nationalist conception of foreign affairs naturally leads to a
nationalist conception of international law.
As the Third
Restatement of United States Foreign Relations Law declares,
"International law and international agreements of the United States
are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the several
States."4 6
According to the Restatement, all forms of international law,
which includes both customary law 47 and law created by international

agreements, are the "law of the United States.

'48

The states naturally

have no role in the development or incorporation of "the law of the
United States," or federal law, and thus are obliged to yield to

customary international law in the face of inconsistent state law, as
they do with all other federal law.49 In fact, scholars have argued that

the Founders created federal control of international law precisely in
order to prevent states from interfering with foreign affairs.5 0
44. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2379 (2003).
45. Id. at 2391-92 (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381
(2000).
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111(1).
47. Customary international law refers to law developed through the practice and
custom of states rather than by formal agreement. See generally JANIS, supra note 4, at
42-44 (explaining difference between treaty-based international law and customary
international law). Historically, most international law was deemed customary but the
modern era has seen an explosion of international law made through treaties between
states. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 57-58 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th
ed. 1963) (describing increased reliance on treaties to "make" international law); see also
Julian Ku, The Delegation of Federal Powers to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 79-88 (2000) (discussing "new"
international law that is developed by international organizations through multilateral
treaties).
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111 cmt. d; id. § 111 n.2.
49. Id. § 111 cmt. d n.2.
50. See, e.g., Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Partof the NationalLaw of
the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 38 (1952) ("The Convention was in substantial
agreement that there must be a national judiciary and that it must have, at least in the last
resort, a paramount authority with respect to the Law of Nations and treaties."); Koh,
supra note 5, at 1825-27 (stating that "every schoolchild knows" that the Framers
supported federal control over foreign affairs and international law); Jules Lobel, The
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The federal government incorporates international law as federal

law through a variety of institutional mechanisms. For instance, the
President, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate,
may make treaties, which have the status of federal law."
Additionally, the President may enter into an executive agreement,
and Congress may implement or approve of such an agreement
through normal legislation. 2 Both the executive agreement and the
approving legislation are equivalent to a treaty and therefore have the
status of federal law as well.53 As such, Congress is understood to

possess the power to implement such international agreement
obligations free of federalism constraints.54 Similarly, on this view,
the President should also possess the independent constitutional

authority to enforce any obligations arising out of international
agreements.
Some cormnentators have also suggested that Congress may
codify customary international law through normal legislation.56 The

constitutional basis of its power to do so has been inferred from its
general powers over foreign affairs,57 its delegated power to regulate

Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law,
71 VA. L. REV 1071, 1093 & n.110 (concluding that framers intended that "international
law was to be federal law"); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's
Power to "Define and Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 447, 463 (2000) ("[T]he framers consistently expressed a strong commitment to a
federal government that would regulate domestic enforcement of international law
norms.").
51. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
52. See id. art. VI.
53. See id; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 303. The view that such
congressional-executive agreements are interchangeable with a treaty has been the subject
of longstanding debate among academics. See generally Bruce Ackerman & David
Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (advocating
interchangeability thesis as example of "constitutional moment"); Joel R. Paul, The
Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 671 (1998) (offering functional attacks on interchangeability of treaties and
executive agreements); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty
Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998) (offering an originalist resolution of the
interchangeability debate); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1221 (1995) (rejecting the interchangeability thesis and the theory of "constitutional
moments").
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 302; HENKIN, supra note 5, at 206-07.
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111 cmt. c.
56. See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 68-69; see also Stephens, supra note 50 at 453-54
(suggesting that the Offenses Clause provides a means for Congress to codify customary
international law).
57. See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 70-71.
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foreign comnierce, s and its authority to "define and punish ...
offenses against the Law of Nations."59
In the absence of
congressional action, many courts and commentators have held that
federal courts can incorporate customary international law as part of
their federal common lawmaking powers.' Federal courts could then
apply customary international law to override inconsistent state
statutes and decisions.6 1 Although this last aspect of the nationalist
conception has come under the heaviest scholarly, and even judicial,
criticism,62 no court has refused to recognize customary international
law as federal law.
C. The Revisionist Critique
The nationalist view of federal supremacy in the incorporation
and integration of international law has come under attack in recent
years by a wave of "revisionist"63 scholarship. Revisionist scholars
58. Id. at 65.
59. Stephens, supra note 50, at 461; see also HENKIN, supra note 5, at 70-74
(discussing the sources of congressional authority to legislate in the international arena).
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 111 cmt. d. But cf Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that "[t]here is no federal general common
law").
61. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
International Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 295, 295-99, 308 (arguing for application of
customary international law to preempt state law permitting execution of juvenile
defendants).
62. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 817-22; see also Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the concept of overriding
state law with customary international law is at odds with the principle of separation of
powers); cf. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91-96 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
federal courts may interpret customary international law).
63. This term has been used to describe scholars who have questioned various
doctrines of foreign affairs law and the assumptions behind them. The key animating
principle appears to be opposition to what Professor Bradley calls "foreign affairs
exceptionalism" in the analysis of foreign affairs doctrines. See Curtis A. Bradley, A New
American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1999). My colleague
Peter Spiro has coined the phrase "new sovereigntist" to describe this approach, although
this may cast a more normative color to the revisionist scholarship than is justified. See
Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution,63 OHIO ST. L. J. 649,
654 n.16 (2002) [hereinafter Spiro, Globalization]; Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9. True "sovereigntists" are likely to reject any
attempt to use international institutions and law to constrain American policy and law.
See, e.g., REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR JESSE
HELMS OF NORTH CAROLINA, SEN. EXEC. REP. No. 98-50, at 42-45, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.

(1984) (Y1.1/6:98-50) (sharply criticizing the Genocide Convention as ineffective and
arguing for various reservations to limit its authority over the United States); JEREMY
RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 34-38 (1998) (critiquing various forms of

international law as applied to the United States).

None of the so-called "New
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have challenged the various doctrinal strands of the nationalist
conception along both historical and functional grounds.
For
65
instance, Professors Ramsey' and Goldsmith have argued that, as a
historical matter, the Constitution does not confer on the federal
government an inherent exclusive power over foreign affairs.66
Rather, they argue that despite broad Supreme Court statements
suggesting otherwise, the federal government may exclude the states
from foreign affairs only through the exercise of a specific power,
such as the treaty or legislative power, delegated to Congress or the
President. Professor Goldsmith has further argued that such a system
would have the functional benefits of conferring the power to decide
whether a state activity interferes with foreign relations on the
political branches of the federal government rather than the federal
courts.67 In contrast to the nationalist emphasis on the importance of
''one voice," the revisionist critique argues that states should be
permitted to speak, and thus create many voices, unless and until
Congress or the President decides to silence them. 6
Other scholars have applied this same critique to the central
doctrines of the nationalist conception of international law.
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have argued that contrary to the
Restatement, customary international law is not federal common law
and cannot override inconsistent state law.69 Professor Bradley has
also argued that the treaty power should be subject to the same
federalism limitations that restrain Congress's powers under Article I
of the Constitution. °
An underlying theme of these critiques is that the nationalist
conception results in a broad federal power to incorporate and
Sovereigntists" can be fairly said to share this much broader, even ideological opposition
to international law and institutions.
64. Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original
Understandingof Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 369-90 (1999).
65. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1617, 1618 (1997).
66. See id. at 1664; Ramsey, supra note 64, at 388-90.
67. Goldsmith, supra note 65, at 1664-89.
68. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism,70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223,125970 (1999). Although Professor Spiro would not classify himself as a "revisionist," he has
consistently argued against a strict nationalist conception of foreign relations based on his
view that the modern "globalization" context obviates the need to maintain one voice in
foreign affairs. See Spiro, Globalization,supra note 63, at 673-715.
69. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 817.
70. Bradley, supra note 8, at 450-56. Professor Bradley's fundamental argument that
there must be some federalism limitations on the treaty power has found support from
Professor Swaine. See Swaine, supra note 8, at 499-510 (accepting some federalism
limitations and exploring option of reviving state compacts with foreign countries).
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implement international law.71 Given the ambitious scope of modern
international law, revisionist scholars have argued that broad federal
power could make notions of federalism in the domestic sphere
irrelevant.72
The revisionist conception of international law, however, has
drawn its own critique. Most prominently, scholars defending the
nationalist conception have argued that exclusive federal control over
international law, both customary and treaty law, has deep roots in
historical practice and, as a practical matter, is essential to
maintaining a coherent system of international law compliance.
1. Customary International Law
For instance, Professor Koh has suggested that the absence of
federal court control over customary international law would violate
the basic constitutional understanding that the federal government
controls all matters related to foreign affairs, especially the
interpretation and incorporation of customary international law.73 He
declares that "the Constitution created the institutions of federal
government precisely to avoid such balkanization of foreign policy
and international affairs."74 As a functional matter, he argues, the
lack of federal control would result in fifty different state
interpretations of customary international law.75 For example, if
customary international law is not federal law, Professor Koh argues
that Massachusetts could "deny the customary international law
protection of head-of-state immunity to Queen Elizabeth on tort
claims arising out of events in Northern Ireland, whereas the fortynine other states could choose instead to grant the Queen every
conceivable variant of full or partial immunity."76
Professor Koh uses this example to illustrate what he believes
would be the absurdity and impracticality of a regime of state control
over customary international law.77 He further argues that "the
71. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99
MICH. L. REV. 98, 105-11 (2000); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 838-49
(calling the nationalist view a "radical doctrine").
72. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 402-09 (describing tension between international law
and domestic state law in areas such as criminal law, commercial law, and human rights);
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 838-44 (describing a new customary international
law "regulating many matters that were traditionally regulated by domestic law alone").
73. Koh, supra note 5, at 1840-41.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1828-29.
76. Id. at 1829.
77. As I have explained elsewhere, Professor Koh's ad absurdum example is actually
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capacity of federal courts to incorporate customary international law
into federal law.., is absolutely critical to maintaining the coherence
of federal law in areas of international concern."78
2. Treaty Power
Attacks on state control over international law also have been
advanced in the treaty making context. The most recent proponent of
the nationalist view of the treaty power, Professor Golove, has
strenuously attacked the idea that states could be relied upon to
implement international treaty obligations independent of federal
supervision.7 9 He argues that "[t]he Founders acted in no uncertain
terms to obviate the possibility that the states would interfere with
the nation's ability to comply with its treaty obligations."8 He cites
the Supremacy Clause's declaration that treaties "were to be 'the
supreme Law of the Land' " and the textual affirmation that " 'the
Judges in every State shall be bound' " as evidence that all treaties
would have the status of supreme federal law.81
Professor Golove does concede, however, that non-self-executing
treaties do not become federal law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause
and require legislative implementation.82 Citing Congress's power
" '[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States,' " he declares that "there has never
been any question but that Congress has the power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to implement any (constitutional) treaty
made by the President and Senate." 83 Professor Golove does not,
however, address the consequences of Congress failing to exercise
this "necessary and proper" power even though, presumably, this
84
failure leaves implementation of the treaty obligations to the states.
not so unthinkable. State and federal courts have inconsistently applied the customary
international law protection of sovereign immunity, which is related to head-of-state
immunity, in a manner not too different from Professor Koh's example. See Ku, supra
note 13, at 307-22 (describing state and federal application of doctrine of sovereign
immunity).
78. Koh, supra note 5, at 1838. Although conceding states do have the ability to
construe their own law in light of customary international law, he emphasizes that such an
ability is only justifiable because it is subordinate to a definitive ruling from a federal
court. Id. at 1851 n.157.
79. Golove, supra note 11, at 1310.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1310-11 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2).
82. Id. at 1312.
83. Id. at 1311 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
84. Professor Henkin is the only scholar adhering to the nationalist view who appears
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Instead, Professor Golove argues that "[t]here is absolutely no
evidence in the text... that the states were to have any role
whatsoever in their implementation."85
Further, the idea of
independent state implementation of treaties is "strikingly
irresponsible" because "[i]t would leave the President and Senate
with no way to know in advance whether they could keep the
promises they made to foreign nations, and it would render them
86
subject to state changes of heart at any point along the way.
Other defenders of the nationalist conception of the treaty
power8 7 have suggested that state implementation of treaties would
actually violate the Tenth Amendment's
prohibition on
commandeering state officials and legislatures to implement national
policies.88 Thus, as Professor Vazquez has argued, a system of state
implementation of the treaty power would result in commandeering
within the meaning of recent Supreme Court precedent such as Printz
v. United States.89 For this reason, he argues:
[T]he power to implement non-self-executing treaties has
always been thought to reside in the federal government. To
apply the anticommandeering principle to the treaty power
would be to hold that the federal government not only has the
power to implement non-self-executing treaties, but also, as a
constitutional matter, the sole and exclusive duty to do so-a
duty that may not be delegated to the states.90
According to Professor Vazquez, if such a duty were delegated to
the states, however, such a result would be "in deep tension with our
to have recognized the possibility that states could play a meaningful role in the
implementation of treaties. See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 150-51. Elsewhere he appears
to conclude that this role is mainly limited to political influence. See id. at 169.
85. Golove, supra note 11, at 1310 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 1312.
87. Professor Bradley suggests that Professor Golove's self-described "nationalist"
position is misleading because Professor Golove actually accepts more federalism
limitations on the treaty power than other defenders of the treaty power have conceded.
See Bradley, supra note 71, at 99-105 (suggesting Golove actually accepts many federalism
restrictions on treaty power). For my purposes, however, Professor Golove's somewhat
restricted view of the treaty power is still part of the "nationalist view" because, as his
vociferous criticism of state implementation illustrates, it depends on a fairly strong
normative theory of the necessity of national control.
88. Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalizationof Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1630, 1647-49; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz and the Treaty Power, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1354-57 (1999); see also HENKIN, supra note 5, at 168-69 (noting the
argument that treaties that assign responsibility for state and local compliance to the
federal government violate the Tenth Amendment).
89. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
90. Vazquez, supra note 88 at 1354 (emphasis added).
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constitutional scheme" because the Constitution was intended to alter
the system of state-controlled implementation.9" Thus, in order to
avoid "commandeering" while still preserving "our constitutional
scheme" he argues that the treaty power should be understood to
operate directly against the states and to require federal control over
such implementation.9 2
In sum, nationalist defenders of the treaty power have rejected
the proposition that states can have any role in the implementation of
international treaty obligations.
Professor Golove's quip that
proposals in favor of state control over treaty implementation are
"'monstrous' " and " 'preposterous' " captures this attitude nicely.93
D. The Significance of State Control Over InternationalLaw
Compliance
At the heart of the nationalist conception is a basic premise:
maintaining one voice with respect to foreign affairs requires
maintaining one voice with respect to the incorporation of and
compliance with international law.
In both the customary
international law and treaty power context, nationalist scholars have
argued that the alternative to federal control over international law is
a sort of incoherence at odds with our constitutional system that
would result in a messy hodgepodge of inconsistent state
interpretation and application of international law.94 If, for instance,
a state refuses to carry out an international law obligation, such as
refusing to obey a treaty obligation to suspend an execution as
interpreted by an international tribunal, the United States fails to
maintain one voice with respect to foreign relations. In such
circumstances, at least one commentator has suggested that the
federal courts can enforce a uniform foreign policy by overriding a
state's refusal to fulfill an international law obligation.9 5 The same
argument undergirds almost all defenses of the nationalist conception
of international law.
The system of state control over international law compliance
described in the next Part undercuts this argument in two ways. First,
the historic importance of the states in fulfilling international law
91. Id. at 1358.
92. Id. at 1358.
93. Golove, supra note 11, at 1310 (quoting Supreme Court Justice William Johnson,
Philonimus No. 7, CHARLESTON MERCURY (S.C.), Sept. 13, 1823).
94. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
95. See Frederick L. Kirgis, Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 704, 706 (1998).
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obligations in the absence of federal compulsion or supervision
suggests that the historical foundations of the nationalist conception
are less sturdy than commentators have believed and that the
Supreme Court has recognized. Second, and more importantly, the
existence of this system, both in the past and in the contemporary era,
belies the nationalist claim that the revisionist conception is
functionally unworkable. If, as this Article argues, the revisionist
conception of international law already exists in many areas of
international law compliance, then the functional arguments for the
nationalist conception are seriously weakened.
II. THE SYSTEM OF STATE CONTROL OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMPLIANCE

According to the nationalist view, states should not play a
significant independent role in the process of complying with
international law obligations because such a role would conflict with
the historical practice of developing uniform international law rules
within the United States. 96 However, state courts have certainly
played a more substantial and independent role in the development
of customary international law than is commonly recognized. 97 This
Section argues that, in addition to state courts, other branches of state
government have also played an important role in the
implementation of customary and treaty obligations, a role that
appears at odds with the nationalist view.
A. The Mechanisms of State Control Over InternationalLaw
States control the implementation of international obligations in
several different ways. First, state courts have always exercised
substantial control over the interpretation of international law largely
free from federal supervision. For instance, state courts applying the
doctrine that "the law of nations is part of the common law" have
incorporated customary international law through their independent
common lawmaking powers.98 State courts have actually played a
96. See supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
97. See Ku, supra note 13, at 291-332.
98. See, e.g., Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561, 572-73 (1868) (applying customary
international law narrowly to uphold contract between belligerents); Manning v. State of
Nicaragua, 14 How. Pr. 517, 517 (N.Y. Sup. 1857) (applying customary international law to
question of whether to grant Nicaragua sovereign immunity from private lawsuit); Wilson
v. Blanco, 4 N.Y.S. 714, 714 (N.Y. Super., Apr. 15, 1889) (applying customary
international law to give immunity to diplomat in transit to third country); State v.
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crucial role in the initiation as well as development of certain
doctrines of customary international law without any supervision or
intervention from the federal courts. 99
Second, state legislatures may enact legislation intended to

comply with

international

obligations

stemming from either

law'00

customary international
or treaties. In some cases, state
legislatures have passed such measures at the urging of the federal

government and, in other cases, they have acted at the urging of
foreign governments themselves. 10 1 State implementation of treaties
is often crucial from a functional perspective, if the treaty is either
non-self-executing or involves areas of law, such as probate law, for
which federal institutions are poorly equipped to regulate.
Additionally, state legislatures may adopt "model codes" or "uniform
laws" promulgated at either the national or international level that
are intended to create a uniform system of laws across national
borders. 0 2 Although this last mechanism does not technically involve

the "incorporation of" international law, it is one example of how
states are participating in an international effort-independent of the
federal government-to unify certain areas of the law.
Third, state governors exercise their powers to enforce or comply
with international obligations, both customary and treaty-based. In
some cases, governors act to enforce customary international law
obligations while in other cases, governors have acted to enforce
treaty obligations. 03 Sometimes the governors have acted at the
request of the federal government while at other times, the governors
Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, 121 (1835) (applying customary international law to take jurisdiction
over kidnapped criminal defendant). See generally Ku, supra note 13, at 291-333
(surveying the contributions that state courts have made to the development of commonly
accepted customary international law doctrines).
99. Ku, supra note 13, at 291-99 (discussing origins in state courts of rule granting
diplomats immunity in transit to third countries).
100. Additionally, states have always been understood to hold the power through
legislation to override doctrines of customary international law that may have been
adopted through the common law. See QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 98 (1922).
101. See infra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing legislation guaranteeing
distribution of workman's compensation benefits to consuls).
102. Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have, for instance, adopted the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Model Law on
Electronic Commerce, http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See UNCITRAL
Status of Conventions and Model Laws, http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/status-e.htm
(last updated (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
103. See, e.g., infra, notes 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing taxation of foreign
consulates).
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appear to be exercising their own independent judgment on whether
and how to comply with international law obligations."
B.

HistoricalExamples of State Control Over InternationalLaw

This Section reviews the historical development of three areas of
international law:
consular powers in estate proceedings, the
immunity of foreign states from taxation, and the treatment of aliens.
In contrast to the nationalist conception, the states, and not the
federal government, took the lead in the implementation of
international law obligations in each of these cases.
1. Consular Powers in Estate Proceedings
One of the most important functions of consuls is the
participation in estate proceedings arising out of the death in the
foreign state of one of its nationals. 10 5 The exact scope of consular
powers in this area, however, was not always clear. 10 6 Because estate
law has traditionally been left to the states, the development of the
international law governing consuls has also been largely left to the
states. 107 Even when the federal government regulated consular
powers through treaty law, however, the states have been afforded
broad discretion in the implementation of these treaty obligations
with little or no federal oversight.
a.

Consular Powers of Administration

The rights of consuls to protect the property interests of their
nationals was recognized as early as 1821 by the Supreme Court as a
principle of customary international law. 1 8 The Court held, however,
that this right of representation under international law did not grant
to consuls a right to receive the proceeds of any property determined
to belong to their nationals. 1 9
104. See infra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing governors' role
implementing tax immunity obligations).
105. See 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES §§ 477-482 (2d ed. 1945); LUKE T.
LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 262-75 (2d ed. 1991); Willard L. Boyd, Consular

Functions in Connection with Decedents' Estates, 47 IOWA L. REV. 823, 824-28 (1962).

106. Boyd, supra note 105, at 824.
107. Id. at 832-33.
108. The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. 152, 168 (1821) ("[T]his court feels no difficulty in
deciding [that a consul] is a competent party to assert or defend the rights of property of
the individuals of his nation, in any court having jurisdiction of causes affected by the
application of international law.").
109. Id. at 168-69. The Court suggested that this question was governed by the
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479

The Supreme Court faced this issue in the context of a property
dispute under admiralty law, but the scope of a consul's right of
representation arose most frequently in state courts. In particular,
state courts were faced with claims by consuls seeking the right to
administer the estates of deceased foreign nationals who had
intestate.11 ° This much more controversial right was claimed as a
matter of customary international law and, eventually, as authorized
by certain bilateral treaties."1
The development and eventual
resolution of these issues triggered all the various mechanisms of state
control over the implementation of international law.
State courts, for instance, took the lead role in analyzing consular
claims under customary international law and treaties to administer
their deceased nationals' estates. The key issue was whether consuls
had the right merely to be heard or whether treaties and other forms
of international law authorized them to administer the entire estate.
As the subsequent discussion indicates, these courts' analysis
reflected a robust sense of their responsibility for the interpretation of
international obligations, especially given the near complete absence
of federal guidance on these issues.
In a typical early case, Succession of Thompson, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana rejected the claim of the Swedish consul seeking
the right to administer an estate under both the consular convention
with Sweden and customary international law.112 Suggesting that this
issue was controlled solely by the state as a matter of state autonomy,
the court declared that the consul's claim of a right to administer an
estate to be "incompatible with the sovereignty of the State whose
jurisdiction extends over the property of foreigners as well as citizens
found within its limits.""' 3 But it also appeared to read the consular
treaty, which did not specifically grant the right to administration, as
failing to grant such a right.1 14 Moreover, no federal statute or
"principle of the law of nations" appeared to require a different

domestic law of the sending state. Id. at 169.
110. See 1 J.G. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW
ADMINISTRATION (INCLUDING WILLS) § 10 (William F. Woerner, ed., 3d ed. 1923).

OF

111. See, e.g., Consular Convention, May 4, 1850, U.S.-New Granada, art. 111(1), 10
Stat. 900, 904 [hereinafter Treaty with New Granada]; Treaty of Amity, May 27, 1818,
U.S.-Swed., art. V, 8 Stat. 232, 236 [hereinafter Treaty with Sweden].
112. Succession of Thompson, 9 La. Ann. 96, 96 (La. 1854).

113. Id.
114. Id. at 97; see Treaty with Sweden, supra note 111, art. 5, 8 Stat. at 236 ("The high
contracting parties grant mutually the liberty of having in the places of commerce and
ports of the other, consuls, vice consuls, or commercial agents, who shall enjoy all the
protection and assistance necessary for the due discharge of their functions.").
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result." 5 Thus, the court refused to read a treaty or customary
international law broadly enough to interfere with subjects within the
sovereignty of the State. Notwithstanding the court's narrow reading
of this particular argument, it did not foreclose the possibility that a
treaty could explicitly permit regulation with subjects that would
otherwise fall under the exclusive sovereignty of the state. One year
later, a New York court reached a slightly different result, finding
that treaty and customary international law allowed a French consul
the right to appear in an estate proceeding, but not as an
16
administrator.'
At about the same time, the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S.
Secretary of State reached different opinions onthis issue. In 1855,
Secretary of State Marcy instructed American consuls overseas to
"act as administrators on the estate of all citizens of the United States
dying intestate in foreign countries,""' 7 but Attorney General Cushing
informed Secretary Marcy a year later, in response to an inquiry from
the Brazilian Ambassador, that "[t]he consul of the decedent's
country can intervene of right only by way of serveillance [sic], and
without jurisdiction.""18
Probably because of this uncertainty, or even because of a
principled position against asserting this authority over the states," 9
the federal government added language to consular conventions
stipulating that a consul "shall not discharge these functions in those
States whose peculiar legislation may not allow it."' 12 Eventually, the
standard clause addressing this issue stated, more cryptically, that the
consul shall have the right to "intervene in the possession,
administration, and judicial liquidation of the estate of the deceased,
conformably with the laws of the country."'' But this language hardly
clarified matters, and state courts continued to struggle with how to
reconcile the treaty obligations with their control over estate
proceedings.

115. Thompson, 9 La. Ann. at 97.
116. Ferrie v. Public Administrator, 3 Brad. 249, 265 (1855).
117. 5 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 722 (1906).

118. Estates of Foreign Decedents, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 98 (1856).
119. See Boyd, supra note 105, at 832 (suggesting that language that limits the effect of
this customary international legal principle against the states reflects the view that the
federal government lacks authority to regulate real property succession by treaty).
120. Treaty with New Granada, supra note 111, art. 111(10), 10 Stat. at 904; see also
Boyd, supra note 105, at 832 (discussing limiting language in treaties).
121. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, July 27, 1853, U.S.-Arg., art.
IX, 10 Stat. 1005, 1009 (emphasis added). For a comprehensive discussion of various
analogous treaty clauses, see Boyd, supra note 105, at 834-40.
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For example, the Surrogate's Court of Westchester County in
New York issued a lengthy opinion rebutting the refusal of the
Surrogate's Court of New York County to recognize a consul's right
to administration under both treaty and customary international
law. 122 While a number of other state courts analyzed the same issue
within the context of the treaty language, few appeared willing to
recognize a right under customary international law to administer
estates, nor did many courts read the treaty language to create such a
right. 123 The United States Supreme Court eventually concurred in
this narrow reading of the treaty, suggesting that clearer language was
necessary in order for the treaty to be read to override state law. 124 It
did not consider the question of whether customary international law
on its own could support the right to administration.125
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to point out the
decentralized system of control over the development of international
law. Instead of uniformity, the system tolerated disuniformity among
the states over the powers held by consuls in estate proceedings under
customary international law and treaties. This disuniformity was
caused largely by the federal government's doubts regarding its
constitutional authority to interfere in estate proceedings by treaty.
Thus, the difficult interpretation of the treaty language was largely
left to state courts, again because of uncertainty as to the scope of the
treaty power.
b.

Consular Notice Rights

While the dispute over the right to administer their deceased
nationals' estates under customary international law and treaty law
fell largely within the province of state courts, certain related legal
developments were handled by state legislatures. In particular,
122. See In re Lobrasciano's Estate, 77 N.Y.S. 1040, 1042-44 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1902). Cf
In re Logiorato's Estate, 69 N.Y.S. 507, 509 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1901) (arguing that the consul
has no "right to set aside the laws of the state" of New York).
123. See, e.g., In re Ghio's Estate, 108 P. 516, 523 (Cal. 1910) (refusing to read a treaty
to "materially abridge the autonomy of the several states and to interfere with and direct
the state tribunals in proceedings affecting property within their jurisdiction"); see also In
re D'Adamo's Estate, 106 N.E. 81, 84-86 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.) (refusing
administration); In re Estate of Costanzo, 15 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 230-31 (Ohio Prob.
1912) (same). But see In re Succession of Rabasse 47 La. Ann. 1452, 1454 (1895) (granting
consuls right to administer estates); In re Wyman, 191 Mass. 276, 278-79 (1906) (same).
124. See Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 332 (1912) ("Had it been the intention to
commit the administration of estates of citizens of one country, dying in another,
exclusively to the consul of the foreign nation, it would have been very easy to have
declared that purpose in unmistakable terms.").
125. Id.
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consuls began to claim the right, under both customary international
law and treaties, to receive notice of any probate proceedings
involving their deceased intestate nationals 2 6 and the right to collect
12 7
workman's compensation benefits for non-resident beneficiaries.
Treaty provisions requiring notice typically required that:
In case of the death of a national of either High Contracting
Party in the territory of the other without having in the
territory of his decease any known heirs or testamentary
executors by him appointed, the competent local authorities
shall at once inform the nearest consular officer of the State of
which the deceased was a national of the fact of his death, in
order that necessary information may be forwarded to the
128
parties interested.
Despite complaints from foreign governments, the federal
government took no action to carry out these obligations, other than
requesting the governors of the various states to adopt measures
guaranteeing these consular rights under customary international law
and treaties.2 9 Perhaps because of the federal government's inaction,
foreign consular officials made requests directly to state authorities
for such notice rights as well. 3 ° A number of states eventually
adopted legislation requiring probate courts to give notice to consular
officials of the death of foreign nationals who had died intestate.'31 A
typical statute provided that:
Whenever it shall appear upon application to any probate court
for letters of administration, or to prove the will of any
deceased person, that the heirs at law of said deceased, or any
of them, are residents of a foreign country, it shall be the duty
of the judge of such probate court to notify the consul, vice126. 1 WOERNER, supra note 110, § 160.
127. See Julius I. Puente, Consular Protection of the Estates of Deceased Nationals, 23
ILL. L. REV. 635, 645 (1929).
128. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, U.S-Nor., June 5, 1928,
U.S.-Nor., art. XXIII, 47 Stat. 2135, 2153. For other treaties with similar provisions, see
treaties cited in Willard L. Boyd, Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory Requirements of
Probate Notice to Consuls and Aliens, 47 IOWA L. REV. 29,32-33 nn.14-18 (1961).
129. See Boyd, supra note 128, at 64-68 (noting State Department recognition of noncompliance); see also 2 HYDE, supra note 105, § 478 (describing letter from Secretary of
State to state governors formally requesting that they comply with consular notification
procedure).
130. See ERNEST LUDWIG, CONSULAR TREATY RIGHTS 117-18 (giving example of
request made by Austro-Hungarian Consul at Cleveland to States within his consular
district seeking notice rights).
131. See Boyd, supra note 128, at 52-65.
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consul, or consular agent, resident in this state, if there be one
of such foreign nation, of the13 pending
of, and the day appointed
2
for hearing such application.
In this way, the treaty obligation to provide notice to foreign
consular officials was implemented by the state governments rather
than through federal legislation or through the operation of the treaty
itself.'33 One commentator has pointed out that it is unclear that
federal legislation would be more effective than a federal treaty and
has suggested implementation through a uniform or model state
law. 34 While not specifically providing for notice to consuls, other
states followed the Model Probate Code's broad notice requirements
to all interested parties, including consuls, who are specifically
empowered to waive the notice right on behalf of their non-resident
13
nationals. 1
Moreover, as workman's compensation programs became more
widespread and important in the early twentieth century, treaties
began to require notice to consuls of workman's compensation
hearings. A typical treaty provided:
A consular officer of either High Contracting Party may in
behalf of the non-resident nationals of the country he
represents, receipt for [their distributive shares derived from
estates in process of probate or] accruing under the provisions
of so-called workmen's Compensation Laws or other like
statutes provided he remit any funds so received through the
appropriate agencies of his Government to the proper
distributees, and provided further that he furnish to the
authority or agency making distribution
through him
136
reasonable evidence of such remission.
Despite these treaty provisions, contemporary

commentary

132. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 702.65 (1948) (repealed 1979).
133. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.41 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 702.65 (West
1948) (repealed 1979); MINN. STAT. § 525.83 (1945) (repealed 1976); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 30-333 (Michie 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-02-13 (1943) (repealed 1973); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.11 (West 1991); WIS. STAT. § 310.05 (1969) (repealed 1971).

134. See Boyd, supra note 128, at 64.
135. LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BAYSE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A
MODEL PROBATE CODE § 16 (1946).

136. Consular Convention, Apr. 22, 1926, U.S.-Cuba, art. xiv, 44 Stat. 2471, 2478-79.

For similar examples, see Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Dec. 23,
1925, U.S.-Est., art. 24, 44 Stat. 2379, 2388; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular
Rights, June 24, 1925, U.S.-Hung., art. 21, 44 Stat. 2441, 2459; Treaty Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 8, 1923, U.S.-Germ., art. 25, 44 Stat. 2132, 2154
[hereinafter Treaty with Germany].
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suggests foreign consuls engaged in direct lobbying of state
governments to fulfill these treaty obligations.137
States laws
expanded the right of consuls to appear in workman's compensation

hearings involving their nationals or where their nationals were
beneficiaries.138 Such provisions were viewed by a contemporary
commentator as a natural extension of the basic rule described in
Bello Corrunes guaranteeing a consul the right to represent the
interests of his nationals in a property proceeding. 39 Such statutes

thus contributed to the development of the customary international
law on powers of consular officials and also implemented the specific

treaty obligations at issue. 14°
The states' activity in clarifying and expanding the rights of

consuls stands in sharp contrast to the federal government's passivity.
Although federal legislation could theoretically have been enacted to

secure compliance with customary international law and treaty
obligations, 14' the federal government has instead limited itself to

requesting that state governors bring these treaty provisions to the
142

notice of local authorities.
Foreign commentators recognized the federal government's
apparent powerlessness in this respect with one early twentieth
century commentator observing that although an 1871 German treaty
provision required notice to consuls, "it is practically impossible for
the American federal government to assure in the states the
137. Foreign consuls appear to have appealed to state legislatures to enact laws
"facilitating the exercise of consular rights conferred by existing conventions, or of
explaining the nature of proposals in contravention of treaty provision, or of exposing the
evils.., of particular discrimination against aliens and their dependents, both resident and
non-resident. 2 HYDE, supranote 105, at 802.
138. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 12151 (5 Howell 1912) (stating that if a non-resident
alien is an heir of a descendent, the probate judge shall notify the consul of the probate
hearing); Minn. Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913, MINN. GEN. LAWS ch. 467 § 23
(1913) (appointing consular official to be representative of alien dependent); 1 OHIO GEN.
CODE § 1465-108 (1946) (consul to supply information of killed employee residing in
foreign country for purposes of Ohio Compensation Act); PENN. STAT. § 22007 (1920)
(consular office may officially represent non-resident alien dependents and may receive
compensation awards for distribution to alien dependents); W. VIR. CODE ANN., ch. 15-P,
§ 39 (Michie 1923) (non-resident aliens may be officially represented by consular office in
country where they are residents, but consular agent cannot make appeals for
compensation on behalf of aliens).
139. Puente, supra note 127, at 650.
140. See also NICHOLAS PENDLETON MITCHELL, STATE INTERESTS IN AMERICAN
TREATIES: A STUDY IN THE MAKING AND SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF CERTAIN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, app. XXVIII (1936) (listing treaties that ensure a
consul's right to collect worker's compensation payments due to a national).
141. See Boyd, supra note 128, at 64.
142. 2 HYDE, supra note 105, § 478.
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execution of the [notice] provision[] ....
In light of these public complaints, the federal government's
unwillingness to take direct action is somewhat surprising. According
to the nationalist conception, the federal government had ample
power to ensure treaty compliance through legislation, an executive
order, or a lawsuit in federal court. Instead, the federal government
relied on the states to carry out the international obligations of the
United States to grant consular rights under both customary
international law and treaties. Recognizing this, foreign governments
adjusted their efforts to communicate with state legislatures directly.
2. Taxation of Foreign State Property
In 1968, the federal government declared in a filing before New
York's highest court:
[T]axation by political subdivisions of the United States of
foreign government-owned real property used for official
purposes has been a growing irritant in the conduct of the
foreign relations of the United States. If left unchecked, such
taxation will prejudice and hamper the effective conduct of our
foreign relations.1"
Despite this assertion, the federal government has rarely exercised
the powers it supposedly holds under the nationalist conception to
force the states to end this "irritant in the conduct of foreign
relations," preferring in most cases to leave the tax question to the
states or to express its views on the subject via correspondence with
state authorities.
States have long played a central role in determining a foreign
sovereign's right to immunity from taxation, a right derived from
customary international law. For instance, in 1859, the State
Department informed the consul from Bremen that any tax
exemption he received was" 'through the courtesy of the authorities
of the several States.' "1145 Even when later State Department
pronouncements endorsed the principle of consular exemption, the
State Department was careful to limit this understanding to federal

143.

See

ELLERY

C.

STOWELL,

LE

CONSUL,

FUNCTIONS,

IMMUNITES,

ORGANISATION EXEQUATUR 82 n.3 (1909), translated in Boyd, supra note 128, at 64

n.137.
144. Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698, 700 (N.Y. 1968)
(internal quotations omitted).
145. 5 MOORE, supra note 117, § 715 (quoting Letter from Mr. Appleton, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State, to Mr. Diller, Consul at Bremen (March 3, 1859)).
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taxation, implying that the states alone controlled the question of
146
immunity from state taxes.
States have also controlled the development and application of

customary international law governing immunity for non-consular
sovereign property. 147 For instance, in 1923, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky voided a tax assessment on tobacco owned by the French
government.14 8 The court held that imposing taxes would violate

principles of sovereign immunity that presumed a foreign sovereign
"does not intend to degrade its dignity by placing itself ...within the
jurisdiction of the other."'4 9 The court also rejected the local tax
assessor's claim that such principles would violate the Kentucky

Constitution's guarantee of a right to tax all property that was not
"public property used for public purposes.' 50
Curiously, the Supreme Court of Kentucky's understanding of
the scope of sovereign immunity for tax purposes was not supported

by the State Department. In response to an inquiry from the Italian
Ambassador about the propriety of the same Kentucky tax, the
Secretary of State replied that "no principle of international law
'
would be violated should such property.., be subject to taxation."151
The State Department took a similar position on a New Jersey local

tax on locomotives owned by the Russian Government. 152 In this case
a state court extended an even broader immunity under customary
international law than what the federal government recognized.
In cases where the State Department did believe taxation would
be improper under customary international law or treaty law, the

prevailing practice was merely to inform the governor of the relevant
153
state of the Department's views and request that he act accordingly.

146. 5 MOORE, supra note 117, at 87 (" 'The general principle is that a foreign consular
officer is subject to no charge in the country of residence, by reason of his official capacity
or acts .... I know of no [United States] internal-revenue tax which could affect the
official character, functions or emoluments of a foreign consul.' " (quoting Letter from Mr.
Frelinghuysen, U.S. Sec. of State, to Mr. de Struve, Russian Minister (April 21, 1884))).
147. See William W. Bishop, Jr., Immunity from Taxation of Foreign State-Owned
Property,46 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 250 (1952).
148. French Republic v. Bd. of Supervisors of Jefferson County, 252 S.W. 124, 125 (Ct.
App. Ky. 1923).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 2 GREEN HAYWARD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 174
(1942).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 172 (describing request to Governor of Missouri); id. at 414 (describing
California's adherence (sort of) to Secretary of State's request to exempt British vessel
from sales tax); id. (describing Secretary's request to City of New York to exempt
Ecuadorian vessel from sales tax). Sometimes the federal government also requests that
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Even these views on the scope of the exemption under customary
international law, however, did not appear to be binding on the states.
For instance, when the Secretary of State requested that California
grant exemptions to French consular officers during World War II,
the Attorney General of California opined that "[c]onsular officers
are appointed primarily for the purpose of protecting and advancing,
in a foreign State, the business and commercial interests of the
'
appointing state and its citizens."154
For this reason, California was
"unable to agree with the contention of the State Department's legal
adviser that the property in question is entitled to tax exemption
solely because it is owned by a foreign government.""15
Occasionally, the State Department exchanged notes with other
governments on the subject. In 1941, the United Kingdom declared
that all property of a foreign government was entitled to tax
immunity under international law and the State Department
responded by limiting the scope of the immunity to personal property
"devoted to the public service."' 5 6 The State Department also refused
to take a position on immunity for real property, saying only that real
property in the District of Columbia would be held exempt.5 7
This exchange of notes was sufficient to convince Connecticut to
reverse its initial refusal to grant an exemption to real and personal
property owned by the United Kingdom. 58
The Connecticut
Attorney General explained that the exchange of notes signified that
the United States and the United Kingdom both accepted a rule of
international law exempting personal property. 59 Therefore, "[s]ince
international law exempts the personal property of a foreign state
from taxation, we are bound to follow it, as it is also the law of the

states exempt foreign consuls from their laws. See 5 MOORE, supra note 117, § 715 (citing
Letter from Mr. Day, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, to Governor of New Jersey (Jan.
31, 1898) (requesting tax exemption for Portuguese vice-consul residing in New Jersey))).
154. Bishop, supra note 147, at 249 (quoting 6 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 287 (Dec. 5, 1945)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 244 (citing 22 CONN. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 236, 414-17 (1942)

(reprinting Letter from Conn. Att'y Gen. Francis A. Pallotti to Conn. Governor Robert
A. Hurley (Aug. 5, 1942))).
157. See Bishop, supra note 147, at 244 (citing 22 CONN. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP.

236, 414-17 (1942) (reprinting Letter from Conn. Att'y Gen. Francis A. Pallotti to Conn.
Governor Robert A. Hurley (Aug. 5, 1942))).
158. Id. (citing 22 CONN. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 236, 414-17 (1942) (reprinting
Letter from Conn. Att'y Gen. Francis A. Pallotti to Conn. Governor Robert A. Hurley
(Aug. 5, 1942))) (refusing to grant exemption); id. at 245 (citing 22 CONN. ATr'Y GEN.
BIENNIAL REP. 236, 414) (granting exemption to personal property only, based on State
Department declaration, but refusing to extend exemption to real property)).
159. Id. at 245 (citing 22 CONN. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 236,414).
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16
State.""
It is also worth noting what the Connecticut Attorney
General did not say. Specifically, he failed to mention that because
the President had entered into an international agreement, that
agreement held the status of federal law which Connecticut was
obligated to follow under the Supremacy Clause.
In some cases, states determined the scope of immunities under
customary international law without any input or guidance from the
State Department at all. Moreover, the key decisionmakers in this
context were the state executive authorities rather than courts. Thus,
a number of state attorneys general opined that customary
international law required tax exemptions for personal property of
foreign states, despite the fact that most states specifically limited
such immunity to personal property and required a showing that it
16
was used for a public purpose. 1
However, the practice of the states was not uniform. Maine, for
instance, refused to exempt the property of the Canadian government
from excise taxes, 6 2 and while California continued to take a
restrictive view of immunity for consuls, Texas extended such tax
immunity to both real and personal property. 63 Thus, the Texas
Attorney General opined:

We take it that regardless of the various ways a rule of
international law may arise, one of the most satisfactory
methods would be by the mutual recognition of its existence
between the governments concerned. Since the Republic of
Mexico has accorded freedom from taxation to the property of
our government used for its embassies and consular officers in
Mexico City, this alone would in our opinion afford the most
laudable reason for the exemption from taxation by our
State ... of the property of the Mexican Government located in
our State used for offices and housing of its ... representatives.
We should recognize this as a binding obligation upon us under
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., id. at 242 (describing how the Massachusetts Attorney General opined in
1920 that tangible personal property owned by U.K. and France cannot be taxed by state);
id. at 245, 248-49 (describing how the California Attorney General issued a 1941 opinion
that found personal property of the United Kingdom to be taxable, but then reversed his

position in a 1942 opinion because of an express agreement of the U.S. and the U.K. that
such property was not taxable); id. at 249 (quoting 6 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 289, 290 (Dec. 4,
1945) (refusing to grant exemption to personal property of the Netherlands unless state
assessor finds property used "for public purposes").
162. Id. at 246 (citing Maine Att'y Gen. Rep. (1947-1948), at 110 (reprinting Letter
from Ralph W. Farris, Maine Att'y Gen., to Maine Governor Hildreth (May 14, 1945))
(refusing to refund excise taxes collected from Canadian government)).
163. Id. at 250 (quoting Tex. Att'y Gen. 0-5031 (Apr. 2, 1943)).
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international usage and international law. 164
This statement is revealing of a state's role in applying
international law. The State of Texas requested neither an opinion
from the State Department nor instructions from any agency of the
federal government as to the proper interpretation of international
law. Significantly, the obligation that bound Texas was based on
"international usage and international law. ' 165 The opinion did not
appear to mention federal law.
The independence of state authorities, at least on questions of
customary international law, is confirmed by the treatment of a letter
from the Legal Advisor of the State Department to the Comptroller
of the City of New York. In this letter, the legal advisor opined that
"under recognized principles of international law and comity the
several states of the United States, as well as their political
subdivisions, should not assess taxes against foreign government'
owned property used for public noncommercial purposes." 166
This
letter reveals the State Department's typical practice with respect to
the implementation of customary international law and treaty
obligations by the states. Prior to this letter, the State Department
had issued a general letter to all state governors advising on the
customary international law and treaty requirements for exemptions
of consuls."67 Thus, the letter is merely informative, because it did not
purport to declare certain state tax laws "nullified," even though
these laws should be unenforceable under the nationalist
168
conception.
The non-binding nature of the State Department's letter is
further illustrated by the City of New York's decision to challenge the
State Department's statement of customary international law as
applied to the Argentine consulate. The Court of Appeals of New
York agreed that it was "not bound to accept the [State
Department's] submission but must make its own determination as to
the status of Argentina's property under international law" and did
not purport to rely on Argentina's claim that customary international
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. LEE, supra note 105, at 546 (quoting Letter from Richard D. Kearney, Acting
Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Comptroller, City of New York (Dec. 24, 1965)).
167. See Office of the Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, Treaty Provisionsin Force between
the United States of America and Other Countries Relating to the Exemption of
Government-Owned Property from Real Property Taxes, 59 AM. J. INT'L L 103, 123-24

(1965).
168. See id.
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law was a matter of "federal common law."' 69 Surveying the various
authorities, including scholarly commentary and state practice, the

Court of Appeals concluded that principles of sovereign immunity in
customary international law extended to the protection of consular
property. 17 0 Again, it is worth emphasizing that at no time did the
court appear to suggest that the Supremacy Clause forced it to follow

precedent set by State Department or federal court determinations
on similar questions.
In addition to determinations made by state courts and
executives, state legislatures have also incorporated or implemented

international obligations in this area. For instance, a number of states
have enacted legislation specifically exempting consuls and consular
property from a variety of local taxes including alcohol and gasoline

taxes. 7 ' The federal government was not completely passive in this
area, although it is again worth noting that it did not pass legislation
to implement or carry out its international obligations to provide such
exemptions. Instead, in the case of the motor fuels tax, the State
Department lobbied individual state legislatures to enact legislation
exempting diplomatic and consular officials. Despite some resistance,
many state legislatures responded to the State Department's requests,

thus permitting the United States172 to claim the right to reciprocal

treatment for its officials overseas.
Although this pattern of federal government deference and
cooperation with the states has been dominant, on at least two
169. Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698, 699-700 (Ct. App.
N.Y. 1968) (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 703-04.
171. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-12-243 (1993) (exempting consuls from license plate tax
and fee); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 5331 (West 1954) (exempting aircraft owned by
consuls from personal property tax); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-3-134(3)(b) (West
2002) (exempting consuls from payment of annual vehicle registration fee); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 237-24.3 (11) (Michie 2003) (exempting consuls and diplomats from excise
taxes if they hold "cards issued or authorized by" the U.S. State Department); MD. CODE
ANN., TAX-GEN., § 9-303.1 (2001) (motor vehicle fuel tax does not apply to retail
purchase of motor vehicle fuel by diplomatic personnel); MINN. STAT. ANN., § 168.012
(West 2001) (exempting consuls from license plate tax and fees); N.H. REV. STAT.
§ 260:52 (1955) (exempting consuls from road tolls); N.Y. TAX LAW § 424 (McKinney
1999) (consuls and vice-consuls' liquor purchases are exempt so long as American consuls
are given reciprocal benefits in the foreign consul's country); WASH. REV. TAX CODE
ANN. § 82.36.245 (West 2000) (qualified foreign and diplomatic consular agents are
exempt from tax on sales of motor vehicle fuel if equivalent exemption granted to similar
personnel of U.S.). But see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482.3675 (Michie 2002) (making
special provision for diplomatic license tags but charging an extra fee for them).
172. See LEE, supra note 105, at 549 (discussing State Department lobbying for state
legislation on gasoline exemptions for consuls); John Lancaster, Md. Senate Takes
Diplomatic Turn, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1989, at B4.
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occasions, the federal government has sued to enforce a treaty or
executive agreement to provide such exemptions.17 3 These suits
support the nationalist view's allocation of the authority to enforce
treaties to the President. But if this power to enforce treaties by
lawsuits is really so well-established, the rarity of such suits is more
striking than their existence.174
3. Treatment of Aliens
a.

Alien Rights with Respect to Real Property

Like consular rights and immunities, the protection of alien
rights to succeed to real property was the subject of some of the
earliest U.S. treaties. The regulation of alien rights to hold real
property, however, has largely remained in the hands of the states.175
States, for instance, clearly hold the authority to permit or prohibit
aliens from succeeding to real property. 176 Aside from rules
regulating public lands, the federal government has never legislated
rules governing alien rights to real property. 177 While its treaties have

173. See United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 934-35 (4th Cir. 1982)
(enforcing 1979 agreement affording the German Democratic Republic immunity from tax
liens on property); United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149, 153-54 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (enforcing consular convention exemption for property of Russian ambassador to

U.N.).
174. The only other context for such suits occurs in litigation to enforce American
Indian treaties. In those cases, the courts appeared to recognize the U.S. interest as
"guardians" of Indian tribe interests. E.g., United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 192
(1926) (permitting the United States as "guardians" to sue for return to Indian tribes title
certain lands held by Minnesota); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1975) (enforcing compliance of the State of Washington with Indian treaties where U.S.
right to sue is not challenged); see also Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266
U.S. 405 (1925) (stating in dicta that U.S. has standing to enforce treaty obligations).
175. See WILLIAM MARION GIBSON, ALIENS AND THE LAW 37 (1940) ("Any
investigation of the treaty provisions [concerning real property] makes it quite evident that
the United States government has not entered into any treaties which completely deprive
the states of their power to decide who shall acquire and continue in possession of real
property."); Virginia v. Meekison, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance of Personal
Property, Considered with Reference to Clark v. Allen, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 319 (1950)
("Treaty provisions regarding real property were ... carefully phrased to preserve the
traditional right of a State to determine for itself who could and could not acquire and
hold land in its jurisdiction .... ").
176. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 338
(1901).
177. See Willard L. Boyd, Treaties Governing the Succession to Real Property by Aliens,
51 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1953). The only area of serious federal regulation of alien
property occurs in the context of war and the definition of "enemy aliens." See Comm. on
Int'l Prop., Estate, & Trust Law, Rights and Restrictions on Interests of Aliens in United
States Estates: Federal and State Laws Affecting Administration and Distributionof United
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had some effect on these rights by guaranteeing non-discrimination,
the federal government has never
required that the states permit
78

1
aliens to inherit real property.
One reason for the lack of a federal policy may be the federal
government's doubts about the scope of its treaty-making powers in
this area. For instance, between 1819 and 1850, treaty-makers
appeared to believe that the treaty power could not interfere with
state regulation of real property.'79 Indeed, the federal government

has since entered into a number of treaties that specifically
conditioned alien property rights on the laws of the individual
states. 8 ' For instance, an 1853 treaty with France granted property

rights to French subjects "in all States of the Union, whose existing
laws permit it."' '
The treaty went on, "[a]s to the States of the
Union, by whose existing laws aliens are not permitted to hold real

estate, the President engages to recommend to them the passage of
such laws as may be necessary for the purpose of conferring this
right."'8 z This practice suggests the presence of federal doubts about
the government's ability to regulate property rights through treaties.
Three years later, however, Attorney General Cushing issued an
unequivocal opinion upholding the right of treaty-makers to regulate
alien real property rights. 83 But doubts lingered. At approximately
States Estates in Which Aliens Hold Interests, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING 157, 163 (Robert A. Hendrickson & William K.
Stevens, eds., 1981) [hereinafter Rights & Restrictions] (describing federal restrictions on
enemy aliens holding real property).
178. See GIBSON, supra note 175, at 35.
179. See Boyd, supra note 177 at 1006; G.W. Duwalt, The Treaties of the United States
and Alien Land Laws of Illinois and Other States of the Union, 43 CENT. L. J. 211, 215
(1896); Samuel Maclintock, Aliens Under the FederalLaws of the United States, 4 ILL. L.
REV. 95, 107-08 (1909); Kurt Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal
Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
323, 325-26 (1954).
180. See Treaty of Commerce, Friendship, Establishments, and Surrender of Criminals,
Nov. 25, 1850, U.S.-Switz., art. 5, 11 Stat. 587, 590-91; Convention, Aug. 21, 1854, U.S.Brunswick and Luneberg, art. 2, 11 Stat. 601, 602; Consular Convention, Feb. 23, 1853,
U.S.-Fr., art. 7, 10 Stat. 992, 996 [hereinafter Treaty with France]; see also Prevost v.
Greneaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1, 14 (1857) (holding that "the obligation of [a treaty with
France] and its operation in the State, after it was made, depend upon the laws of
Louisiana"); Lehman v. Miller, 88 N.E. 365, 367 (Ind. App. 1909) (pointing out that the
federal government negotiated a treaty with Switzerland based in part on the realization
that some states might not allow aliens to hold real estate); Jost v. Jost, 1 Mackey 487, 495
(D.C. 1882) (observing that it is "doubtful whether the Federal Government has authority,
in virtue of the treaty making power, and, therefore, whether it could have intended to
interfere with the laws of descent in relation to real property in the several States").
181. Treaty with France, supra note 180, art. 7, 10 Stat. at 996.
182. Id.
183. 1857 Op. U.S. ATT'Y GEN. 411.
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the same time that Cushing issued his opinion, Secretary of State
Marcy was informing foreign diplomats that "it is not competent for
the Government of the United States to interfere with the legislation
of the respective States in relation to the property of foreigners dying
ab intestato or in regard to inheritances of any kind."'"
Professor Golove has suggested that these and other statements
by the federal government disclaiming the power to regulate state
affairs through treaties were disingenuous and that the real
motivation was to avoid entering into the treaty in the first place.185
But, as he notes, the federal government continued to make what
appears to be contradictory statements about its power to regulate
real property through treaties.186 Rather than reflecting a pattern of
disingenuous subversion of treaties, as Professor Golove suggests, the
erratic and sometimes contradictory performance of the federal
government could also reflect a serious good faith disagreement
about the scope of the treaty power to regulate real property.
In any event, even after concluding that the federal government
had the power to enter into treaties that affected real property, the
State Department continued to refer all inquiries seeking
implementation or enforcement of those treaties to the states. Thus,
Secretary of State Evarts informed the Russian ambassador in 1877:
The local authorities of the State of New York are vested with
exclusive control over property of decedents in that State, and no
functionary of the Government of the United States can
properly interfere in any such matter. By article X of the treaty
between the United States and Russia of 1832, Russian subjects
may inherit the personal estate of decedents in the United
States, and may take possession therof, by themselves or by
others; and, if the heirs are absent, the property is to be taken
care of till it is claimed by them. The function of taking care of
it is not vested in the Department of State, but judging by the
course generallypursued by the United States in such matters, the
most proper and effective course with regard to property in New
York claimed by Russian heirs would seem to be for the Russian
instruct its consul general at New York in regard
government to
187
to the matter.

184. See 4 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1906).

185. Golove, supra note 11, at 1241-42 nn.550-52.
186. See id. at 1242 n.552 (noting self-contradictory views of Secretaries of State
Hamilton, Fish, and Bayard).
187. Letter from Mr. Evarts, U.S. Secretary of State, to Mr. Boker, Minister to Russia
(Nov. 9, 1877), reprinted in 4 MOORE, supra note 184, § 535 (emphasis added); see also
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In short, enforcement of real property rights under a particular
treaty must be directed toward the state government even though the
treaty was constitutional and, under the Supremacy Clause, held the
status of federal law. In fact, unlike the French treaty, the language
of the Russian treaty appeared to explicitly grant the rights that the
Russians sought to enforce. 18 8 To wit, the treaty guaranteed that a
Russian could inherit and dispose of real property without unfair
taxation or other treatment.189 Despite this unequivocal language, the
State Department seemed to believe that the enforcement of the
treaty right could only be made through the vehicle of the state
governments.
To be sure, state attempts to regulate property inheritances by
aliens through statutes requiring reciprocity from the alien's home
country were famously invalidated by the United States Supreme
Court in Zschernig v. Miller.19 The Zschernig Court invalidated the
reciprocity statute on the grounds of a general federal foreign affairs
power rather than with respect to an existing bilateral treaty.191 Even
in this instance, however, it is worth noting the relative passivity of
the political branches of the federal government, which had informed
the Court that no effect on foreign relations would flow from the
application of the reciprocity statute in the Zschernig case.192
Zschernig has also been the subject of a substantial amount of
commentary, much of it critical,'93 and lower courts applying
Letter from Mr. Bayard, U.S. Secretary of State, to Mr. Jackson, (July 17, 1885), reprinted
in 6 JOHN BASSETT MOORE,

A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 993

(1906)

(explaining that diplomatic complaints are only a last resort after all local judicial
remedies have been exhausted).
188. See, e.g., Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, May 11, 1833, U.S.-Russ., art. 10, 8
Stat 444, 448 [hereinafter, Treaty with Russia].
189. Id. at art., 8 Stat. at 450. The treaty stated:
And where, on the death of any person holding real estate, within the territories
of one of the High Contracting Parties, such real estate would, by the laws of the
land, descend on a citizen or subject of the other party, who by reason of alienage
may be incapable of holding it, he shall be allowed the time fixed by the laws of
the country, and in case the laws of the country actually in force, may not have
fixed any such time, he shall then be allowed a reasonable time to sell such real
estate and to withdraw and export the proceeds without molestation, and without
paying to the profit of the respective governments any other dues than those to
which the inhabitants of the country wherein said real estate is situated, shall be
subject to pay, in like cases.
Id.
190. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
191. Id. at 667.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 65, at 1649, 1664-80 (describing Zschernig as
constitutional innovation but criticizing functional necessity); see also Bradley &
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Zschernig have continued to uphold state laws restricting inheritance
by aliens, provided that the examination of foreign statutes is limited
to facial analysis. 9 4 Thus, despite the broad potential sweep of
Zschernig, states still retain primacy in the regulation of alien
succession rights to real property with little or no federal intervention
through either treaty or statute.'9 5 Even though the Supreme Court
has endorsed both the use of the treaty power and the federal
government's broad foreign affairs powers over the states,' 96 the
states have maintained a central role in the administration of the
property of aliens. 197 Furthermore, with the narrow exception of
Zschernig, the federal government has suggested it would rely on the
states to implement and carry out any treaty obligations involving
alien property1 98
b.

Remedies for Injuries to Aliens

Both under customary international law and pursuant to treaties,
Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 865 (describing Zschernig as "dormant" and saying it retains
"little, if any, validity").
194. For instance, a federal court in Montana upheld a similar reciprocity statute on
the grounds that it did not require treating foreign law as an issue of fact. See Gorun v.
Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725, 728 (D. Mont. 1968) (per curiam), afd, 393 U.S. 398 (1969) (per
curiam). This reading was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the same year that Zschernig
was decided, and included a concurring opinion by Zschernig author Justice Douglas. See
Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398, 398 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). The case then went back
to a Montana probate court, which ruled that the federal courts had found that reciprocity
existed and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. See In re Estate of Giurgiu, 466 P.2d 83, 84
(Mont. 1970). This ruling was reversed by the Montana Supreme Court, id., but the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal for lack of a substantial federal question.
Gorun v. Montana, 399 U.S. 901 (1970); see also Mora v. Battin, 303 F. Supp. 660 (N.D.
Ohio 1969) (per curiam) (overturning a state court's ruling that denied inheritance rights
to citizens of Czechoslovakia); In re Estate of Leikind, 239 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 1968)
(holding that because there was no showing of conduct by the court as described in
Zschernig, the statute was not unconstitutional). In other contexts, courts have refused to
apply Zschernig unless there is a showing that a state statute has more than an "incidental
or indirect effect in foreign countries." Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148
F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., 529 U.S. 89 (2000); see
also Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 751-53 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that because the statute in question does not raise diplomatic concerns and
does not single out any one country, it does not violate the rule from Zschernig).
195. See Rights & Restrictions, supra note 177, at 170-81 (giving overview of states'
roles). Of course, these cases could be called into question given the Supreme Court's
recent endorsement of Zschernig in Garamendi. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S.
Ct. 2374, 2388 (2003).
196. See, e.g., Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440 (citing general foreign affairs power as basis
for preempting state law); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-33 (1920) (rejecting
Tenth Amendment challenge to application of treaty power).
197. See Rights & Restrictions,supra note 177, at 170-81.
198. See 6 MOORE, supra note 187, § 993.
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the federal government is obliged to take actions to punish private
individuals who injure aliens in the United States. Failure to do so
may make the federal government responsible for the alien's
pecuniary losses. 199 In imposing this duty, treaties often require the
United States to extend "the most constant protection and security
for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect that
degree of protection that is required by international law. '' 200
Accordingly, Secretary of State Fish declared in 1873 that
[t]he rule of the law of nations is that the Government which
refuses to repair the damage committed by its citizens or
subject, to punish the guilty parties or to give them up for that
purpose, may be regarded as virtually a sharer in the injury and
as responsible therefore.2 1
The United States, however, has had difficulty fulfilling its
obligations under this rule because, for much of its history, only the
state governments had the jurisdiction to punish outbreaks of
violence against aliens.2 2 In such circumstances, upon receiving
protests from foreign ministers about mob violence against their
nationals, the United States would plead constitutional helplessness.
For example, when the Chinese minister demanded action by the
federal government after mobs ransacked and pillaged a Chinese
settlement in Colorado, the Secretary of State replied:
As to the arrest and punishment of the guilty persons who
composed the mob at Denver, I need only remind you that the
powers of direct intervention on the part of this Government
are limited by the Constitution of the United States. Under the
limitations of that instrument, the Government of the Federal
Union cannot interfere in regard to the administration or
execution of the municipal laws of a State of the Union, except
under circumstances
expressly provided for in the
Constitution.2 3
Thus, even though Article II grants the President the "Executive
Power" and charges him with the duty to "Take Care" that laws be

199. See 2 HYDE, supra note 105, § 289A (discussing damages (or lack thereof) arising
from failure to prosecute).
200. Treaty with Germany, supra note 136, art I, 44 Stat. at 2134; see also MITCHELL,
supra note 140, at 78-80 (discussing this treaty).
201. 2 HYDE, supra note 105, § 289A n.10.
202. See MITCHELL, supra note 140, at 80.
203. 6 MOORE, supra note 187, § 1025.
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executed,2° the President appears to lack, according to the Secretary,
the power to enforce international law obligations against the states.
Indeed, the federal government even denied its liability under
international law for the failures of the states to punish wrongdoers,
declaring that any payments of restitution it made were out of comity
rather than obligation. °5 This view was eventually abandoned by
President Harrison in 1891, who declared that in response to protests
from Italy over the lynching of a number of Italians in New Orleans:
The officers of the State charged with police and judicial
powers in such cases must, in the consideration of international
questions growing out of such incidents, be regarded in such
cases as Federal agents as to make this Government answerable
for their acts in cases where it would be answerable if the
United States had used its constitutional power to define and
punish crimes against treaty rights.0 6
Having conceded liability to make reparations, however, the federal
government continued to disclaim the ability to force state
governments to act in absence of federal legislation authorizing
federal prosecutions. 20 7 A series of Presidents continued to make
requests to Congress for such legislative authority but to no avail.0 8
Hence, the federal role has remained limited to making apologies and
appropriating compensation.2 9
Under the nationalist view, however, it is not obvious why the
President could not have acted alone to enforce the nation's
international law obligations to provide minimum protection to alien
residents. President Harrison, in theory, could have sued the state
and local governments of New Orleans for injunctive relief or for
damages pursuant to the enforcement of its treaty with Italy, which
guaranteed Italian nationals "the most constant protection and
security for their persons and property, and [that they] shall enjoy in
204. U.S. CONST, art. II, §§ 2,3.

205.
206.
207.
208.

See 2 HYDE, supra note 105, § 290 nn.5 & 8.
6 MOORE, supra note 187, § 1026.
2 HYDE, supra note 105, § 290.
See Spiro, supra note 68, at 1236-37; Charles H. Watson, Need of Federal

Legislation in Respect to Mob Violence in Cases of Lynching of Aliens, 25 YALE L.J. 561,

577-79 (1916) (discussing failed efforts of various presidents from Harrison to Taft to get a
federal law passed that would punish crimes against aliens committed in violation of treaty
obligations).
209. See Ronan Doherty, Foreign Affairs v. Federalism: How State Control of Criminal
Law Implicates Federal Responsibility Under International Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 1281,

1335-37 (1996) (pointing out that the federal government has no legislative authority to
remedy injuries to aliens in violation of international law or treaties).
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this respect the same rights and privileges as are or shall be granted to
210
the natives.
In alien protection cases, it was again left to the states to handle
the nation's international obligations. In some instances, states have
discharged this duty through normal processes of investigation and
prosecution.2 1' On other occasions, the state, after prodding from the
State Department, itself paid compensation for violations of treaty
obligations.2 12 More interestingly, state legislatures also provided civil
redress to victims of mob violence by enacting legislation permitting
recovery of damages against the local jurisdiction where a lynching
occurred.213 Such legislation was not limited to alien victims, but it
was used successfully by alien victims to obtain judgments and
compensation.2 14
C.

Summary

The preceding discussion suggests that states have played an
important role in carrying out international law obligations on behalf
of the United States. Not only have state courts developed and
applied principles of customary international law largely free of
federal court supervision, but state executives have independently
determined the scope of their duties under customary international
law. State legislatures have acted to implement treaty obligations by
adopting legislation such as guaranteeing notice in probate
proceedings or exempting foreign state property from certain local
taxes. In many of these areas of law, the federal government has
played a largely passive role by requesting, rather than commanding,
state compliance with international obligations.
While the states did not feel obligated to obey international law
as "federal law," there are indications that states did feel obligated to
obey international law as "international law." In so doing, the states
seemed to take seriously their independent duty to comply with
international law. For this reason, compliance with consular and
sovereign immunity from taxation was relatively strong despite the

210. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 26, 1871, U.S.-Italy, art. III, 17 Stat.
845,846.
211. See, e.g., 2 HYDE, supra note 105, § 290 n.6. (discussing Colorado prosecutions of
mob leaders).
212. Letter from Mr. Olney, U.S. Secretary of State, to Governor of Georgia (Feb. 9,
1897), reprintedin 6 MOORE, supra note 187, § 998 (instructing Georgia to pay damages to
Sweden for proceedings against a Swedish vessel by a local justice of the peace).
213. 2 HYDE, supra note 105, § 292.
214. Id.
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lack of direct federal supervision. 215 In other words, states appear to
have been free to decide whether and how to comply with
international law obligations, and for the most part, they did.
III. CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES OF STATE CONTROL OVER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The system described in Part II, in which states implement
certain international agreements and obligations, independent of
federal supervision, is not merely historical. In the modern era, states
have continued to control compliance with international law in a
variety of areas, including probate law, commercial law, and consular
relations. In a modern twist, however, state control in some of these
areas of private law has become intertwined with the "uniform laws"
system promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. Additionally, states have begun to play an
important role in carrying out U.S. commitments to international
institutions and obligations under international human rights treaties.
Overall, the continued existence of this system of state control further
undercuts the nationalist conception of international law.
A.

Private InternationalLaw and the Uniform Laws System

In recent years, the movement to harmonize and unify private
areas of law internationally has gained momentum. A variety of
international institutions, the most prominent of which include the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), and the
International Institute for Unification of Private International Law
("UNIDROIT"), have facilitated the discussion, negotiation and
adoption of a dizzying array of treaties aimed at unifying or
harmonizing areas as diverse as probate law, trusts, family law, and
216
commercial law.
215. See supra notes 144-74 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by
Letters of Credit, Dec. 11, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/48 (1995), 35 I.L.M. 735 (1996)
(providing guidelines for credit arrangements); Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, S.
TREATY DOc. No. 105-51 (1998), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1994) (establishing
guidelines intended to safeguard the best interests and fundamental rights of
internationally adopted children); United Nations Convention on International Bills of
Exchange and Promissory Notes, Dec. 9, 1988, U.N. Doc. A/43/820 (1988), 28 I.L.M. 170
(1989) (establishing a new type of negotiable instrument for international transactions);
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased
Persons, Oct. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 146 (1989) [hereinafter Hague Convention on
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The United States has traditionally stayed aloof from such efforts
to unify private international law, due in large part to concerns that

the United States could not enter into such treaties without violating
state autonomy.2 17 However, U.S. reluctance eventually faded and it
began actively participating in the negotiation of a number of

important private international law conventions.2 1 8 Because concerns
about federalism continued to linger, however, the State Department
found new and creative ways to involve the states in the process.

Most importantly, the State Department began consulting directly
with the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State
Laws seeking to harness this lawmaking mechanism to encourage
219
states to implement U.S. treaty obligations.

As a result, three models for contemporary state implementation
of treaties on private international law have emerged. First, states
may, as in case of the Convention for a Uniform Law on the Form of
an International Will, implement a non-self-executing treaty through
the adoption of a uniform law expressly designed to implement the
convention. Second, states may adopt a uniform law implementing

Succession] (governing inheritance practices); Hague Convention on the Law Applicable
to Trusts and on Their Recognition, Oct. 20, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1388 (1984) [hereinafter
Hague Convention on Trusts] (providing a uniform system for trusts); Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No.
99-11 (1985), 1343 U.N.T.S. 98, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980) (presenting rules to
secure the prompt return of children kidnapped and taken away from their home
countries); United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 98-9 (1998), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980)
(adopting uniform rules to govern sales contracts); Convention Providing a Uniform Law
on the Form of An International Will, Oct. 26, 1973, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-29 (1986),
reprintedin 12 I.L.M. 1298 (1973) (adopting uniform rules for interpreting wills).
217. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 179, at 357-62 (arguing that the federal
government is cautious to enter international treaties regarding private law because of a
seeming lack of authority to command state governments to follow them).
218. For instance, the United States did not join the Hague Conference, which is one of
the premier organizations for negotiating private international law conventions, until 1964,
eleven years after the Conference was fully established. See Statute of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, July 15, 1955, 15 U.S.T. 2228. Similarly, the
United States did not join the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
until 1964, twenty-four years after the Institute's charter was established. See Charter of
the International Institute for the Unification of Private International Law, March 15,
1940, 15 U.S.T. 2494 (1964). Since then, the United States has signed but not ratified a
number of private international law treaties under the auspices of both organizations. See
Hague Convention on Succession, supra note 216; UNIDROIT Convention on
International Financial Leasing, May 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 922 (1988); Hague Convention on
Trusts, supra note 216; Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization
for Foreign Public Documents, Oct. 5, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 883.
219. See Richard D. Kearney, The InternationalWills Convention, 18 INT'L LAW. 613,
619 (1984):
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treaties that have not yet been ratified by the Senate (and for which
ratification is not assured). Finally, in some cases states have
implemented treaties through legislation in tandem with federal
implementing legislation or a self-executing treaty. All of these
modern mechanisms for state implementation are consistent with past
practice with respect to consular rights in probate proceedings, tax
immunities, and real property. The only modern innovation is the
reliance on the Uniform Laws system.22 °
1. State Implementation of Non-Self-Executing Treaties:
Convention on the Uniform Law for the Form of an International
Will
In 1973, the United States hosted negotiations for the
Convention on the Form of an International Will under the auspices
of UNIDROIT in Washington, D.C. The purpose of the Washington
Convention was "to provide testators with a way of making wills that
will be valid as to form in all countries joining the Convention. 22 1
The Convention relied on two key mechanisms for ensuring
recognition of wills across borders: (1) all states would adopt a
uniform law that recognizes an "international will" that is created in
the form agreed upon by the Convention,2 22 and (2) the uniform law
would define and specify "authorized persons" to verify and validate
223
an international will.
President Reagan submitted the Washington Convention to the
Senate in 198624 and the Senate ratified it in August 1991.225
220. In an important article on treaty interpretation, Professor Van Alstine uses these
commercial international law conventions as an example of the need for courts to draw on
formalist "dynamic" interpretive methods. See Michael Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 694-701, 775-85 (1998). Professor Van Alstine

overlooks, however, the role that state legislatures and the uniform laws system play in the
implementation of private international law at the state rather than federal level. See id.
at 690 (stating that the ratification of private international law conventions places at issue
"nothing less than federal arrogation of traditional state competence in the law governing
private, and in particular commercial, relations").
221. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (2001).

222. Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, Oct.
26, 1973, art. I., 12 L.L.M. 1302, 1302 (Nov. 1973) reprinted in UNIF. PROBATE CODE art.

II, pt. 10 prefatory note (2001) [hereinafter Washington Convention].
223. Washington Convention, supra note 222, art. II, 12 I.L.M. at 1302.

224. President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Providing a
Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, 1986 PUB. PAPERS 905-06 (July 2,
1986), available at 1973 U.S.T. LEXIS 321 [hereinafter Submittal Letter].

225. See Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will,
102d Cong., 137 CONG. REC.

X/A.102/1:137/121).

S12131 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (Sup. Docs. No.
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However, to date the treaty is still not officially in force. Like other
self-executing treaties, the Convention requires implementing
legislation; but what is unusual about the Washington Convention is
that the implementation contemplated by the executive branch is on
the state rather than the federal level. Specifically, the treaty will not
enter into force without state implementation via adoption of a
revised Uniform Probate Code or an International Wills Act.
From the outset, the subject matter of the Washington
Convention raised concerns about federal encroachment on areas of
state control. Indeed, one commentator accused the Convention's
draftsmen of seeking "not merely the resolution of international
probate problems but knowingly undert[aking] the subversion of the
traditional role of the American states in enforcing their own rules for
2 6
testing the validity of testamentary instruments.
Although the Washington Convention specifically allowed
federal states to limit their obligation to particular sub-units, the
United States failed to make such a declaration.2 7 On the other
hand, despite one influential commentator's recommendation,22 8 the
federal government also refused to implement the treaty by relying
exclusively on federal legislation:
It would be undesirable, however, to rely exclusively on federal
legislation to bring both aspects of the Convention-the
execution of international wills as well as their recognitioninto force.
Our testators and their attorneys are not
accustomed to consulting federal statutes for guidance on the
formalities for making wills; they should continue to be able to
place primary reliance on the laws of their States, rather than
on federal law, for this purpose. What is therefore to be
recommended to the Congress and the several State
legislatures, is that the making of international wills within the
United States be governed by State legislation, with each State
free to decide whether it wishes to make it possible for testators to
execute wills in its jurisdiction in this new form.229
Not only did the federal government announce that it would rely
on the states in this way, but it chose to use the uniform laws system

226. Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., The Convention on International Wills, 23 AM. J. COMP. L.
119, 120 (1975).
227. See Submittal Letter, supra note 224, at 905-06.
228. See Kurt Nadelmann, The Formal Validity of Wills and the Washington

Convention Providing the Form of an International Will, 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 365, 375
(1974) (arguing for federal statutory implementation).
229. Submittal Letter, supra note 224, at 905-06 (emphasis added).
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to implement its treaty obligations under the Washington
Convention.2 3 Thus, the National Conference of Commissioners for
Uniform State Laws was enlisted to adopt model legislation
implementing the treaty. 23 1 Although the Convention obliges the
federal government to pass implementing legislation to require
uniform recognition of international wills by "authorized persons,"
the amendments to the Uniform Probate Code effectively guarantee
the same result.2 3 2 In theory, the promoters of the Washington
Convention expected federal legislation to impose on all states the
requirement of recognizing foreign wills executed in accordance with
the Convention. 233
No such federal legislation was actually
introduced, however, resulting in what one commentator called a
"bizarre patchwork of states which do and do not have state
234
implementing legislation.
Not only does this "bizarre patchwork" exist today, but nine
states enacted amendments to the Uniform Probate Code specifically
designed to implement the Washington Convention prior to the
Senate's advice and consent in 1991.235 Even today, although no
federal legislation has been passed, a total of sixteen states have
essentially decided to enter into the Washington Convention
230. See Kearney, supra note 219, at 628.
231. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (2001).
232. See, e.g., Washington Convention, supra note 222, Annex, art. 1, 12 I.L.M. at 1307.
The treaty provides:
A will shall be valid as regards form, irrespective particularly of the place where
it is made, of the location of the assets and of the nationality, domicile or
residence of the testator, if it is made in the form of an international will
complying with the provisions set out in Articles 2 to 5 hereinafter.
Id.
233. Kearney, supra note 219, at 630-31.
234. Tim Covell, Legislation Should Prompt States to Enact International Wills Laws,
TR. AND EST., May 1994, at 42-43.
235. See Act of May 1, 1990, ch. 79, 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. 79 (West) (codified as
amended at CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6380-6390 (1991)); Act effective Apr. 17, 1989, 1989
Colo. Legis. Serv. 180 (West) (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-1001 to
-1011 (2002)); Act of June 19, 1987, 1987 Conn. Legis. Serv. 369 (West) (codified as
amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-1 to -9 (West 1994)); Act effective Jan. 1,
1991, 1990 Legis. Serv. P.A. 86-1291 (West) (codified as amended at 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 10/0.01-10/10 (West 1992)); Act effective Mar. 24, 1978, ch. 525, 1978 Minn. Laws
153 (codified as amended at 19 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.2-1001 to -1010 (West 2002));
Act of Feb. 27, 1991, ch. 62, 1991 Mont. Laws 170 (codified as amended at MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 72-2-901 to -910 (2001)); Act effective July 1, 1993, ch. 66, 1992 N.M. Laws 748
(codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2-1001 to -1010 (Michie 1995)); Act of
Mar. 15, 1979, ch. 376, 1979 N.D. Laws 915 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 30.1-08.2-01 to -09 (1996)); Act of July 28, 1981, ch. 481, 1981 Or. Laws 519 (codified as
amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 112.232 (1997)). Cf infra note 236 (listing states who
enacted the provisions of the Washington Convention after the Senate approved it).
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themselves through their enactment of laws implementing that
convention.236 Testators in those states can execute wills under the
Convention, and foreign international wills are recognized in those
states.
The Washington Convention thus illustrates the modern
incarnation of the system of state control over international law
described in Part II. Facing the choice between federalizing an area
of traditional state regulation or permitting states to control
compliance, the federal government has essentially left
implementation to the states, as it did in the past with respect to
consular rights to notice in estate proceedings. Thus, although the
United States has not formally declared that its treaty obligation
would extend only to certain states of the Union as Canada did with
respect to its provinces, 237 as a practical matter, compliance with the
International Wills Convention essentially rests with the willingness
of state legislatures to adopt implementing legislation found in the
Uniform Probate Code. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe
that the federal government considers such state implementation to
interfere unduly with its need to maintain a single voice with respect
to adoption of international law.
2. State Implementation Prior to Senate Ratification
The model of state implementation through the uniform laws
system has also apparently been adopted with respect to other signed,
but not ratified conventions. The Uniform Probate Code ("UPC")
contains provisions "in harmony with" the Hague Convention on the
Conflicts of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary
Dispositions.238 While seemingly unremarkable, it demonstrates that
the UPC, which has been adopted by a majority of American states,
has incorporated treaty provisions that have not even been submitted
to the Senate for ratification.
236. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1997, ch. 75, 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 308, 308 (codified as
amended at ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.12.912 to 13.12. 921 (Michie 2002)); Act effective June
25, 1997, ch. 81, 71 Del. Laws 177, 177 (1997) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12 §§ 251-59 (2001)); Act effective Apr. 1, 2000, No. 386, 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 1738,
1738 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700-2951 to 700-2959 (West
2002)); Act approved Mar. 20, 1995, 1995 Va. Acts ch. 443, 637, 637 (codified as amended
at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-96.2 to 64.1-96.11 (Michie 2002)). Cf. supra note 235 (listing
states who enacted the provisions of the Washington Convention before the Senate
approved it).
237. See Submittal Letter, supra note 224, at 905-06 (pointing out that four Canadian
provinces had adopted the Act).
238. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1002 cmt. (2001). See Eugene Scoles, The Hague
Convention on Succession, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 85, 103 (1994).
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Similarly, one Uniform Trust Code section allowing a settlor to
designate the governing law and, in absence of such designation,
providing choice of law rules, is "consistent with and was partially
patterned on the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts
and on their Recognition. '239 While broadly phrased, the Uniform
Law reporter's open acknowledgement that the wording follows the
Hague Convention is a further example of the states adopting a rule
established in a treaty never submitted for ratification.
Additionally, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act provides that a custody determination can be
registered without any request for enforcement.2 40 As the official
comment to this section notes, this provision is required by the Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and
Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures of
the Protection of Children, a treaty that has not yet even been signed
by the United States.241
3. Joint Federal-State Implementation
In some instances, the federal government and the states act in
conjunction to implement treaty obligations.
For instance, the
Uniform Child Custody and Enforcement Act enables adopting states
to "enforce an order for the return of the child made under the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction ' 24 2 even though that convention was also implemented by
the federal International Child Abduction Remedies Act
("ICARA").2 43
Similarly, the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of
Legalization for Foreign Public Documents 244 appears to supersede
various state practices related to notary recognition. 245 Nonetheless,
most states enacted legislation to ensure implementation anyway

239.

UNIF. TRUST CODE

§ 107 cmt. (2000).

& ENFORCEMENT ACT § 305(a) (2000).
241. See Hague Convention of October 19, 1996, on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law,
Recognition, Enforcement, and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and
Measures for the Protection of Children, Status Sheet, at http://www.hcch.net/e/status/
proshte.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
242. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 302.
243. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (2000).
244. Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public
Documents (Oct. 5, 1961), 20 I.L.M 1405 (1981).
245. See, e.g., State of California Attorney General's Opinion on the Hague
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents,
21 I.L.M 357,357 (1982) (concluding that Notary Convention overrides California law).
240.

UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
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Acts 246 or

ConsularNotification and Consultation Rights

Although the role of states in compliance with international law
is perhaps most central in the area of private international law, states
also play important roles in the fulfillment of other international law

obligations. For instance, upon the arrest of a foreign national, a
state is responsible under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations for notifying such nationals of his or her right to
communicate with consular officials.248 Prior to entering into the
Vienna Convention in 1964, however, the United States had long
recognized a right for an arrested alien to contact consular officials.249

The obligation of the receiving state to inform the arrested national
of the right to contact consular officials appears to have been an
250
innovation of the Vienna Convention.
246. UNIF. LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTs § 6 (1982).
247. See Act of Apr. 9, 1996, ch. 127, sec. 11, 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws 642, 645 (codified as
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-325 (2003)); Act of June 30, 1981, ch. 61, sec. 4, 63
Del. Laws 87 (1981), Act of June 19, 1984, ch. 275, sec. 4325, 64 Del. Laws 630, 631 (1983)
(codified as ameded at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4326 (2003)); Act of Apr. 27, 1990, ch.
1205, sec. 6, 1990 Iowa Acts 303, 304 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE § 9E.13 (2003));
Act effective July 1, 1984, ch. 201, sec. 6, 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws 806, 809 (codified as
amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 53-507 (2003)); Act effective Aug. 1, 1985, ch. 268, sec. 8,
1985 Minn. Laws 1199, 1203 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 358.46 (2003)); Act of
Mar. 25, 1993, ch. 192, sec. 8, 1993 Mont. Laws 488, 491 (codifed as amended at MONT.
CODE ANN. § 1-5-608 (2003)); Act of Aug. 25, 1969, ch. 523, sec. 2., 1969 Neb. Laws 2139,
2140 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 64-202 (1943)); Act of May 11, 1993, ch.
115, sec. 12, 1993 Nev. Stat. 200, 201 (codified as amended at NEV. REV. STAT. § 240.165
(2003)); Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 281, sec. 6, 1993 N.M. Laws 2861, 2866 (codified as
amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-14-6 (Michie 1978)); Act effective Nov. 1, 1985, ch. 131,
sec. 7, 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws 361, 364 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 49, § 117
(2003)); Act effective Jan. 1, 1986, ch. 156, sec. 15, 1985 Wash. Laws 591, 599 (WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.44.150 (2003)).
248. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocols, Apr. 24, 1963,
art. 36 (1)(b), 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292 [hereinafter VCCR].
249. 4 GREEN HAYWARD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 441
(1942) (citing 1936 State Department letter responding to Italian foreign minister's query
on this subject); LEE, supra note 105 at 136; see Arthur K. Kuhn, Protection of Nationals
Charged with Crime Abroad-Case of Lawrence Simpson, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 94-97
(1937) (describing how an American national arrested by the Nazi government was
allowed to communicate with the American Consulate during his detention in a
concentration camp).
250. Compare 2 HYDE, supra note 105, § 469 n.12 (citing a 1936 letter to an Italian
ambassador refusing to recognize consul's automatic notification right, but permitting
consul to visit upon prisoner's request), with LUKE T. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON
CONSULAR RELATIONS 137 (1996) (discussing commentary on the effects of the Vienna
Convention on diplomatic relations including the right to contact consular officials).
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In any event, the historical practice of the United States in this
regard has also relied on state implementation. Thus, when the
Mexican government protested California's unwillingness to permit a
Mexican consular official to visit a detained Mexican national,25 1 the
Secretary of State wrote a letter to the Governor of California
informing him that Mexico granted the United States such visitation
rights.2 52 Hence, the Secretary "earnestly requested prompt action"
to allow the visitation to take place. 3 California apparently granted
this request.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR"),
which the United States joined in 1969, took the consular assistance
obligation one step further, requiring that state authorities notify the
detainee of his or her consular assistance rights.2 4 Nonetheless, the
implementation of the treaty obligations with respect to consular
assistance for detained foreign nationals has remained largely with
the states.
The State Department's explanation of how the United States
complies with its VCCR notification requirements illustrates the
continued existence of a decentralized approach to treaty
implementation. It explains:
[T]he obligations of consular notification and access are binding
on states and local governments as well as the federal
government, primarily by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in
Article VI of the United States Constitution ....[I]t is also
open to government entities to adopt laws or regulations for the
purpose of implementing these obligations. 5
This decentralized view of international law implementation
resonates with this Article's positive account of state-led
implementation.
The federal government has adopted no
implementing legislation because "executive, law enforcement and
judicial authorities can implement these obligations through their
existing powers." '5 6 This sentence is not limited in scope to federal
251. 4 HACKWORTH, supra note 249, § 441.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. VCCR, supra note 248, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
255. STATE DEP'T, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS: INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FEDERAL, STATE, AND OTHER OFFICIALS REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS TO ASSIST THEM, PART
FIVE:
LEGAL
MATERIAL,
BASIS
FOR
IMPLEMENTATION,
at

http://www.travel.state.gov/notification5.html#basis (last visited Nov. 4, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).

256. Id.
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entities. The statement emphasizes that entities at all levels of
government are obligated to enforce obligations under customary

international law and treaty law and that even a self-executing treaty
can be implemented by states adopting new rules and legislation.

7

In fact, state implementation may be the sole mechanism for
ensuring U.S. compliance with the Vienna Convention, because the

federal courts have foreclosed most judicial remedies for foreign
nationals arrested in violation of their Vienna Convention
obligations. For instance, federal courts have uniformly held that
evidence seized in an arrest in violation of the Vienna Convention,
although self-executing, does not give defendants the remedy of
suppressing such evidence from trial.258 Additionally, federal courts
have uniformly held that the doctrine of procedural default, which

stems from more recent congressional enactments limiting challenges
under federal and constitutional law in habeas corpus petitions,

prevents any foreign national from attempting to use a Vienna
Convention violation to attack either his sentence or conviction in
post-trial proceedings.259

Although the Vienna Convention is a self-executing treaty with
federal law status, the federal government itself has limited
implementation at the federal level through post-arrest or post-

conviction judicial remedies. Thus, just as states were called upon to
adopt legislation to implement consular notice obligations in probate
and workman's compensation proceedings, states have begun to
adopt implementing legislation for the VCCR. Florida and California
have both adopted legislation relating to VCCR obligations to
provide consular notification rights to detained foreign nationals.2"
California's statute provides:
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2002)
(concluding the VCCR did not create any individual rights); United States v. Bustos de la
Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding VCCR does not support ineffective
assistance of counsel claim); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding that VCCR does not provide a suppression of evidence remedy); United
States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1195 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v.
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that VCCR does not
provide a judicially available remedy of suppression of evidence and no other country has
allowed that type of remedy under the treaty either); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 61
(1st Cir. 2000) (stating that even if VCCR created individual rights, remedies of
suppression of evidence or dismissal of charges cannot be inferred without specific
language in the treaty).
259. See, e.g., Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 1998) (denying
defendant's habeas corpus petition on grounds of procedural default because he failed to
raise the VCCR defense at his trial).
260. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)(1) (2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 901.26 (West 2003).
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In accordance with federal law and the provisions of this
section, every peace officer, upon arrest and booking or
detention for more than two hours of a known or suspected
foreign national, shall advise the foreign national that he or she
has a right to communicate with an official from the consulate
of his or her country .... 261
Such a statute appears to be, at the very least, redundant given that
the Vienna Convention is self-executing, but state participation in the
implementation of binding treaty obligations, such as what this
Article has described in the context of consular estate rights and
diplomatic tax immunities,262 is hardly unusual. Given the general
failure of local and state authorities to implement the Vienna
Convention obligations-and the federal government's decision not
to permit any judicial remedies for arrests made in violation of the
treaty-the state statute serves as a necessary mechanism for
improving U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations. For instance,
the California statute instructs local officers to follow State
Department guidelines and provides that training manuals setting
forth treaty requirements would be distributed by December 31,
2000.263
Of course, the motivation behind implementing the VCCR may
be less about international law compliance and more about trying to
prevent further challenges by arrestees who have failed to receive
their VCCR notification. 26 1 Even so, it is unclear why the state
legislators believed they could close a loophole that appears to have
been required by a treaty of the United States.
Florida also adopted legislation implementing the VCCR.
Rather than emphasizing implementation, however, Florida's statute
specifically states that "[f]ailure to provide consular notification
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations or other
bilateral consular conventions shall not be a defense in any criminal
proceeding against any foreign national and shall not be cause for the
'265
foreign national's discharge from custody.
The purpose of this legislation is somewhat mysteious. On the
261. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)(1).
262. See supra notes 105-26, 144-74 and accompanying text.
263. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)(2), (c).
264. See Calif. Sen. Comm. on Public Safety, Arrest of Foreign Nationals, Comm. Rep.
on SB 287 (March 16, 1999), at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/sen/sb_02510300/sb_287_cfa_19990316_125225 sen comm.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (stating that one purpose of bill is to "attempt to close the 'loophole' on Consular
Relations Appeals for death row inmates").
265.

FLA. STAT. ch. 901.26.
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face of it, Florida is attempting to limit the effect of the VCCR, which
is a treaty and equivalent to federal law, in state criminal proceedings.
Florida cannot claim that it holds the final power to interpret the
VCCR, but it might argue that because the VCCR is unclear on how
to address violations of its terms under domestic law, it is simply
"implementing" the VCCR the way it sees fit for the purposes of
Florida criminal proceedings. In theory, Florida's legislature could
have adopted a different statute that specifically granted such judicial
remedies under the VCCR, despite the federal courts' previous denial
of such remedies.
Whatever the rationale, the intervention of Florida and
California in VCCR legislation, especially their attempts to limit the
treaty's effect, makes little sense from the nationalist perspective. In
light of the system of state control over international law discussed
above,266 however, this legislative activity is hardly surprising. Where
the federal government, has decided against further implementation
of a treaty obligation at the federal level, states have the discretion to
legislate with respect to implementing, or even limiting, such
2 67
obligations.
C. InternationalInstitutions: The ICI Proceedings
While states have some role in the implementation of VCCR
obligations, the federal government's acknowledgement of states' role
in complying with international law has been rare in recent years. For
instance, in the submittal of the Washington Convention, the
President expressly disclaimed any federalism concerns.2 6 However,
a recent interchange between the United States and the International
Court of Justice has resulted in the federal government's strongest
contemporary endorsement of an independent state role in the
69
implementation of international law obligations.1
266. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
267. Although legislation has been introduced in Texas to implement the VCCR and to
regulate relations with the many Mexican consulates in the state, such legislation has
apparently died in the Texas Senate. See Anthony Spangler, Mexican Officials Criticize
Consul Rights Bill Failure, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, June 7, 2003, at 12.
268. Submittal Letter, supra note 224, at 905-06.
269. Through its ratification of the U.N. Charter, the United States is party to the ICJ
Statute. See U.N. CHARTER art. 93 ("All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice."); id art. 94 ("Each Member of
the United Nations undertakes to comply with a decision of the International Court of
Justice in any case to which it is a party."). Although the United States withdrew from the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in 1985, it is still party to a number of treaties, including
the VCCR, that commit it to litigation of certain disputes in the ICJ. See Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory
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In 1998, the government of Paraguay sought remedies against the
United States for the failure to fulfill the VCCR obligations with
respect to a Paraguayan citizen scheduled for execution in Virginia.270
Paraguay sought remedies from both the United States Supreme
Court, by filing a suit against Virginia for its violation of the VCCR
obligations, and the International Court of Justice.2 1 1 Two years later,
Germany sought similar remedies to stop Arizona from executing two
of its nationals who had also failed to receive such notification
rights.272 More recently, Mexico filed an almost identical application
on behalf of all Mexican nationals who have been convicted and
sentenced to death in the United States, although it is not yet clear
whether Mexico will seek intervention from the United States
Supreme Court.273
All three countries obtained a "provisional measures" order
from the ICJ, 274 stating that the United States "should take all
measures at its disposal to ensure that" the condemned foreign
nationals were not "executed pending the final decision in these
275
proceedings.
In the first two instances, however, the Supreme Court refused to
enforce the ICJ order due to its procedural posture in a habeas
proceeding and due to the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition of

Settlement of Disputes, April 24, 1963, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488
("Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may

accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the
dispute being a Party to the present Protocol."); BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 326 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing withdrawal from ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction).
270. See Breard Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, 1998 I.C.J. at 249-50.
271. See id., 1998 I.C.J. at 249-50.
272. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (I.C.J. Provisional Measures Order of Mar. 3,
1999), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3) [hereinafter LaGrand Provisional Measures Order], available

at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
273. Avena Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, at para. 15.
274. The ICJ has the power "to indicate ...any provisional measures which ought to
be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 41(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1061. According to the ICJ, such
provisional measures orders are "legally binding" on member states to the same extent all
its decisions are binding. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 17, para. 109. Under Article 94
of the United Nations Charter, the refusal of one party to comply with a decision of the
ICJ provides grounds for the other party to seek remedies from the United Nations
Security Council. U.N. CHARTER, art. 94(2).
275. See LaGrand Provisional Measures Order, supra note 272, 1999 I.C.J. at 16;
BreardProvisional Measures Order, supra note 17, 1998 I.C.J. at 258.
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lawsuits against the states. 276 In other words, the federal government
appeared to foreclose any judicial remedy, either by the foreign state

or by the foreign national, to enforce U.S. obligations under the
VCCR.
Although the ICJ's communication was styled an "order," the

United States responded to these communications in a manner
similar to its response to other demands from foreign governments
that it fulfill international obligations for injuries to aliens, for the
protection of land rights, or for the exemption from local taxes.277 It
forwarded the ICJ's decision to the relevant government authorities,

here the governors of Virginia, Arizona, Texas, and Oklahoma. In
one of these cases, Breard v. Greene, Secretary of State Albright

"requested" the governor of Virginia to stay the pending execution in
consideration of the ICJ's decision.278 The federal government did

not take any other action, and, in fact, filed amicus briefs in the
United States Supreme Court opposing the foreign governments'
27 9
legal actions against the individual states.

Despite the State Department's requests, neither of the
governors in the first two cases stayed the executions.28 ° In the Breard
276. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111 (1999) (per
curiam); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998).
277. See supra notes 105-214 and accompanying text.
278. Breard Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 19, at app. F (excerpting letter from U.S.
Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright to Virginia Governor James Gilmore); see
Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, (F.R.G. v. U.S.), paras. 2.14, 4.169-4.171
& annex 16 (Sept. 16, 1999) [hereinafter LaGrand F.R.G. Memorial] (describing how
Secretary of State Albright took no action in the LaGrand case other than forwarding the
ICJ order to Arizona Governor Jane Hull).
279. BreardAmicus Curiae Brief, supra note 19, at 51.
280. At the time of this writing, the response of the U.S. and Oklahoma governments
to the ICJ's Mexico order was yet to be determined. See Toby Sterling, World Court
Orders U.S. to Stay Executions of Three Mexicans, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 2003, at 3 ("Clifford
Sobel, U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands, said the Justice Department was 'studying the
decision.' It would be 'premature' to say whether the U.S. will abide by the decision,
Sobel said."); Kevin Sullivan, World Court Orders U.S. to Stay Executions of Three
Mexicans, WASH. POST, February 6, 2003, at A32 (noting that Charles Barclay, a State
Department spokesman, stated that the U.S. was still studying the ICJ order and the ICJ
had not yet ruled on the merits of Mexico's case). Jennifer Miller, the chief of criminal
appeals for the Oklahoma Attorney General's office, said that Oklahoma was reviewing
the ICJ order. See Sullivan, supra. The U.S. State Department is also reviewing the order
and has not said whether Washington will order Texas and Oklahoma to stay the
executions. The U.S. argued the order would interfere with its sovereign right to
administer its criminal justice system." Id. Texas, however, has already decided to refuse
to comply, although it is unclear what it would do if the federal government made a
request. Texas to Ignore Court Order to Stay Executions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7,2003, at A33
[hereinafter Texas to Ignore Court Order] (reporting that Texas will ignore the February 6,
2003 ICJ order and go ahead with the executions, whereas Oklahoma and the United
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case, the State Department expressed its regrets to the ICJ but
explained that the United States, by requesting the Governor to stay
the execution, had fulfilled its obligations under the ICJ Charter to
"take all measures at its disposal." The Solicitor General stated in his
brief to the Supreme Court that the "federal system imposes limits on
the federal government's ability to interf.ere with the criminal justice
systems of the States." Indeed, the "measures at the United States'
disposal under our Constitution may in some cases include only
persuasion ...and not legal1 compulsion through the judicial system.
28
That is the situation here.
In proceedings before the ICJ, the United States made similar
declarations about the collision between the ICJ's order and the
federal government's limited power over the states. 28 2 In the
LaGrand case, for example, the United States' Counter-Memorial
declared, in language reminiscent of previous State Department notes
to foreign powers with respect to alien land rights or tax immunities:
[T]he separate states of the United States retain their
independence and authority except in areas where the Federal
Government has been allocated power by the Constitution of
the United States. The separate states are not subsidiary bodies
subordinate to the power of the Federal Government and
subject to its direction. Rather, they remain sovereign and the
masters of their affairs within the areas of responsibility
reserved to them by the United States Constitution.2 83
Such statements, though consistent with U.S. actions, make little
sense under the nationalist conception. Not surprisingly, these
statements and actions have been subject to a torrent of criticism
abroad 2' and from academics at home.8 If the federal government
States are in the process of reviewing the order). Gene Acuna, a spokesman for Texas
Governor Rick Perry, stated, " 'According to our reading of the law and treaty, there is no
authority for the federal government or this World Court to prohibit Texas from
exercising the laws passed by our legislature.' " Id. The Governor believes that the U.S.
courts provide adequate safeguards and are the appropriate forum to hear cases regarding
consular notification on a case-by-case basis; therefore, orders from the state and federal
courts are the only ones that Texas will follow. See id.

281. BreardAmicus Curiae Brief, supra note 19, at 51.
282. Verbatim Record of Public Sitting, Tues. Jan. 21, 2003, 11:30 a.m., at 31, paras.
3.43-3.44 (Statement of U.S. Department of State Principal Deputy Legal Advisor James
H. Thessin), Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuscr/imus-icr2003-02_20030121 .pdf
[hereinafter Avena Thessin Statement] (last visited Jan. 7, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
283. See LaGrand U.S. Counter-Memorial, supra note 18, para. 121.
284. See, e.g., M. Wesley Clark, Providing Consular Rights Warnings to Foreign
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Nationals,FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., March 1, 2002, at 28 (" 'Violations of Article 36
followed by death sentences and executions cannot be remedied by apologies or the
distribution of leaflets.' "(quoting Germany's response to an apology by the United States
and their endeavors to educate law enforcement about Article 36)); Peter Finn, Foreign
Leaders Laud on Death Penalty in Illinois, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2003, at A19 (" 'The
death penalty is un-American because it postulates the infallibility of a government
institution,' wrote Die Welt, the conservative German daily. 'America's democracy is
based on the mistrust of government, on the ability to revise all decisions.' "); Peter Finn,
UN Wades into Death Penalty Fray; Court: U.S. Broke Pact by Executing German in 1999,
CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2001, at 4 (" 'I hope [the decision] sets a precedent in terms of the
United States' application of international obligations,' said Claudia Roth, leader of
Germany's Greens Party, 'and that all cases on non-Americans on Death Row will be
reviewed.' "); Cragg Hines, Consular Rights, Station House Wrongs, HOUST. CHRON.,
Feb. 23, 2003, at C2 (stating that Mexico is very serious about U.S. enforcement of the
Vienna Convention and noting that last year Mexico's President, Vincente Fox, canceled a
meeting with President Bush to protest the execution of a Mexican in Texas); Andrew
Osborn, US Broke Law in Double Execution, THE GUARDIAN, June 28, 2001, at 17
(noting that Germany was quick to welcome the ICJ decision because it signifies an
increase in the rights of Germans when arrested abroad); Carol J. Williams, U.S. Ignored
Law in German Case, U.N. Rules; Court: Reprimand Over Brothers' ConsularRights and
Their Executions Is Seen as a Boost to the Foes of the Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
2001, at A3 (noting that German officials hailed the ruling as a victory for human rights
and that German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer welcomed the ruling as a vindication
of Berlin's position).
285. See, e.g., Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions on
Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 27, 108 (1999) (discussing the possible political implications of the United States'
disrespect for the ICJ in the Breard case, including the deterioration of the United States'
international reputation and diplomatic relations with Paraguay, the denial of access to
consular services for U.S. citizens arrested abroad, and the weakening of the U.S. position
in seeking remedies before the ICJ in future cases); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of
InternationalLaw in the United States and the LaGrand Case, 27 YALE J. INT'L LAW 427,
427 (2002) (stating that the LaGrandcase has not "resulted in a discernable improvement
in the United States compliance with the Vienna Convention" and that "[t]he gross
deficiencies of U.S. practice regarding consular access under Article 36 of the Convention
are a sad but telling reflection of the unreality of international law in the United States
today"); Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
147, 149 (1999) ("Individual American citizens are placed in harm's way when the
government fails to adequately protect the rights of foreign citizens in the United
States."); Howard S. Schiffman, The LaGrand Decision: The Evolving Legal Landscape
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1099, 1133-34 (2002) (stating that the cases of Breard and LaGrand
illustrate the need for a "more sensitive approach to the effects of a treaty breach"
because these cases strain international relations, contribute to the "United States's
isolation over the issue of the death penalty," and emphasize "an inability or unwillingness
to follow through on important obligations of international law"); Cara Drinan, Note,
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Private Enforcement in
American Courts After LaGrand, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1303 (2002) (stating that
American courts have failed to correctly interpret and announce the LaGrand decision);
Karen A. Glasgow, Note, What We Need to Know About Article 36 of the Consular
Convention, 6 NEW ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 117, 131 (2000) ("There does not
appear to be sufficient action by the State Department with regards to its responsibility of
upholding the Consular Convention."); Chad Thornberry, Comment, Federalism vs.
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controls the incorporation and implementation of international law
obligations, especially international treaty obligations, how could the
federal government aver that it had taken "all measures at its
disposal" by simply requesting state compliance?

These claims, however, make more sense when viewed in the
context of this Article's account of state control over international
law. A foreign entity, in this case an international court, demanded
that the United States comply with a treaty obligation. In this case,
the obligation required the United States to "take all measures at its
disposal" to ensure the executions did not happen. However, given
the nature of the federal system, the obligation required
implementation by state governments rather than by the federal
government. In these circumstances, the state government, on behalf
of the United States, is the only body authorized to fulfill the
international obligations embodied in the order."6
As we have seen, the state governments usually, but not always,
comply with such international requests.
In these instances of
noncompliance, the state governors may have believed that their
actions did not in fact violate international obligations, because a
substantial body of authority supported the view that an ICJ order
was not "binding" as a matter of international law.287 Or the state
Foreign Affairs: How the United States Can Administer Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations Within the States, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 107, 108-10
(1999) (noting that the cases of Breard and LaGrand have notified the world that the
United States frequently violates its consular notification and have caused the
international world to question the United States' intentions regarding treaty obligations
in general); Jennifer Lynne Weinman, Comment, The Clash Between U.S. Criminal
Procedure and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: An Analysis of the
InternationalCourt of Justice Decision in the LaGrand Case, 17 AM. U. INT'L REV. 857,
861-62 (2002) (noting that "many legal commentators and international scholars have
criticized the United States" for relying on the Vienna Convention when U.S. citizens are
overseas, while lacking a firm commitment to ensure the same rights for foreign nationals
on U.S. soil).
286. Indeed, the federal government has come close to declaring that it simply lacks
any power at all to enforce state compliance with an ICJ Order. In opposing Mexico's
application for a provisional measures order, the State Department argued that Mexico's
proposed order requiring the United States to "take all measures necessary to ensure" the
executions did not occur "could well test the limit of federal authority, if not go well
beyond it." Avena Thessin Statement, supra note 282, at 32, para. 3.44 (internal
quotations omitted).
287. LaGrand F.RG. Memorial, supra note 278, para. 216 & annex 33 (Statement of
Arizona Governor Jane Dee Hull); id. para. 4.163 & annex 59 (Statement of Virginia
Governor James Gilmore); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 903, reporters'
note 6 (1987) (discussing disagreement among scholars as to whether a provisional order is
"binding" on state-parties to the ICJ Statute). The ICJ resolved this question in its Final
Judgment in LaGrand and clarified that provisional orders are "binding." LaGrand
Judgment, supra note 17, paras. 98-110.
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governments may simply have made the determination to refuse to
comply with the ICJ order. This view may be suggested by Texas'
announcement that neither the World Court nor the federal
government had the power to interfere with their execution of a
Mexican national convicted and sentenced under Texas law.28 8
Although the underlying dispute is about the "self-executing"
VCCR, the question of enforcing state compliance with ICJ
provisional measures orders arises under the U.N. Charter and the
ICJ statute. Both treaty obligations have been previously found to be
non-self-executing. 2 9 The U.S. obligation to obey the ICJ's orders is
found in Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter, which requires that "each
member... undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in
290
any case to which it is a party.
Such broad language is unlikely to be deemed self-executing
given Article 94(2)'s statement that "[i]f any party to a case fails to
perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment
rendered by the [ICJ], the other party may have recourse to the
Security Council. ' 29' By indicating an alternative remedy for noncompliance, it is unlikely that a court would find the ICJ provision of
the Charter to be self-executing because the Charter itself
contemplates that the resolution of ICJ disputes have been
committed to the Security Council.29
The fact that the Supreme Court would not enforce an ICJ order
in a suit brought by an individual or a foreign state, however, does not
mean that the federal government itself could not have acted to stop
the executions at issue. While the President could not have exercised
his pardon powers in a state conviction,29 3 scholars have suggested
288. See Texas to Ignore Court Order,supra note 280.
289. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir.
1985) (explaining that Articles 55 and 56 of U.N. Charter are non-self-executing); Hitai v.
INS, 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965) (same); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1952)
(same); see also Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding ICJ Statute does not confer a private right to enforce ICJ orders
and that Statute is non-self-executing).
290. See Reagan, 859 F.2d at 935 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 94).
291. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2; Reagan, 859 F.2d at 938.
292. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2.
293. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (" 'The President ... shall have power to grant
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment.") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Grossman, 1 F.2d 941 (N.D.
Ill. 1924) (holding that President's pardon power does not extend to contempt crimes).
Even the German government seemed to recognize this legal fact when it acknowledged
in a letter to President Clinton that, "you have no means at law to influence the
decision... of Ms. Jane Dee Hull, the Governor of Arizona." Letter from Roman
Herzog, President, F.R.G., to William J. Clinton, President, U.S., quoted in LaGrand U.S.
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that the federal government has the power to sue the state in order to
enforce the United States' treaty obligations 294 or to simply issue an
executive order staying any state executions.295 For this reason,
scholars have argued that the United States failed to fulfill its
296
international legal obligations to take "all measures at its disposal.
Although the ICJ itself stated that the "choice of means must be left
to the United States" for giving effect to the treaty obligations, 297 it
also found that merely transmitting the letter to the Governor of
Arizona was insufficient.2 98 Still, a claim that the President holds a
unilateral implementation power is not entirely convincing from
either a historical or functional perspective.299
Although Presidents have, on a few occasions, sued in federal
court to enforce a treaty obligation,3" all of these suits appear to have
been brought to enforce treaties that were already self-executing.30 1
Counter-Memorial, supra note 18, para. 123.
294. See Henkin, supra note 20, at 681; see also Halberstam, supra note 20, at 1
(discussing the federal government's constitutional authority to require states to comply
with treaties that affect state criminal law proceedings).
295. Vazquez, supra note 20, at 690 (arguing that U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute
delegate to President authority to order compliance with provisional measures orders via
an executive order.).
296. Henkin, supra note 20, at 681; Vazquez, supra note 20, at 690.
297. LaGrand Judgment, supra note 17, 2001 I.C.J. at para. 125.
298. Id. paras. 111-12.
299. Nor has the federal government endorsed these mechanisms.
In fact, in
proceedings before the ICJ they have consistently denied that these powers exist. See, e.g.,
LaGrand U.S. Counter-Memorial, supra note 18, para. 125 (calling "an Executive order to
a state governor to stay an execution.. .unprecedented and fraught with legal
uncertainty.").
300. See, e.g., United States v. Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 935-36 (4th Cir. 1982)
(permitting U.S. to bring suit to enforce tax immunity treaty obligation); United States v.
City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (same); see also Sanitary
Dist. of Chicago, 266 U.S. 405, 425 (1925) (stating in dicta that U.S. has standing to
enforce treaty obligations). The only other context for such suits appears to occur in the
context of suits to enforce American Indian treaties. See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota,
270 U.S. 181, 191-92 (1926) (returning to Indian tribes title to certain lands held by
Minnesota); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 684-85 (1975) (enforcing
compliance of State of Washington with Indian treaties).
301. In many cases where the President has been permitted to sue to enforce a treaty
obligation, courts have regarded the treaty in question as self-executing. See, e.g.,
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 193-95 (1999)
(enforcing Treaty with the Chippewa, July 29, 1837, U.S.-Chippewa, 7 Stat. 537);
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
674-685 (1979) (enforcing various Indian treaties, including the Treaty of Medicine Creek,
Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.-Nisqually, 10 Stat. 1132); Mille Lacs, 270 U.S. at 203, 215 (enforcing
Treaty with the Chippewa, July 29, 1837, U.S.-Chippewa, 7 Stat. 537, the same treaty
litigated in Mille Lacs); Sanitary Dist., 266 U.S. at 426-27 (enforcing Boundary Waters
Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Can., 36 Stat. 2248); Arlington, 669 F.2d at 935-36 (enforcing
Agreed Minute on Negotiations Concerning the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations,
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Extending this power to non-self-executing treaties like the ICJ
Statute would be troublesome and somewhat unprecedented. If the

U.N. Charter (and therefore the ICJ Statute) is "non-self-executing,"
it could either be because its obligations are improper for judicial
resolution or because the treatymakers sought to limit the domestic
effects of the treaty, especially against the states. 3°' Both of these
motivations are plausible inferences. The U.N. Charter expressly

excludes its effect on "matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state, ' 30 3 and the United States
conditioned its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ on
Furthermore, Congress
the exclusion of domestic matters.3 4
implemented the U.N. Charter via the United Nations Participation

Act without including any provisions permitting judicial enforcement
of ICJ orders. 30 5 All of these actions could plausibly support an intent
of the treatymakers to ensure no domestic effect of a treaty obligation

without implementing legislation.

In fact, in the context of

congressional-executive

Congress

agreements,

has specified

by

statute the conditions upon which the President can bring a suit to
enforce an international obligation.3 6
Such analysis applies with equal force to the claim that the
President had the authority to issue an executive order to enforce the

Sept. 4, 1974, U.S.-G.D.R., 25 U.S.T. 2597); Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1257, 1259
(8th Cir. 1981) (enforcing Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Can., 36 Stat. 2248,
the same treaty litigated in Sanitary District); Washington, 520 F.2d at 693 (enforcing
various Indian treaties, including the Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.Nisqually, 10 Stat. 1132, the same treaty litigated in Fishing Vessel Ass'n); In re Estate of
Charkowsky, 392 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1977) (allowing consular officer to
represent interests of Soviet nationals in New York estate proceeding by invoking the
Consular Convention and Protocol, June 1, 1964, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 19 U.S.T. 5018, 5025).
302. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § Ill(4)(a) (noting that a treaty is
non-self-executing if agreement "manifests an intention that it shall not become effective
as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation"); id. § 111(4)(b)
(treaty is non-self-executing "if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty.., requires
implementing legislation.").
303. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7.
304. REMARKS OF HON. TOM CONNALLY RELATIVE TO THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

("CONNALLY RESERVATION"), S. DOc. NO. 79-58, at 7, 79 Cong. 1st Sess. (1945) (Serial
Set# 10951).

305. United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287 (2000).
306. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(b)(2),
(c)(1)-(2), 108 Stat. 4809, 4817-18 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3512(2) (2000)) (barring anyone
other than the United States from challenging U.S. or state action or inaction based on its
consistency with the Uruguay Round Agreements); Uruguay Round Agreements Act:
Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 656, 675-77, (1994),
reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,4327 (Sup. Doc. No. Yl.1/7: 103-316).
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ICJ orders.3"7 While it is true that the Supreme Court has previously
upheld an executive order overriding state law in Dames & Moore,
none of the special factors cited by the Court in that case, including a
long history of congressional acquiescence by statute in executive
claims settlements, were relevant here.3 8 The Court relied on an
inference of congressional assent to presidential action.30 9 This assent
is harder to find in the case of the U.N. Charter (and the ICJ Statute),
given that the treaty is non-self-executing and that Congress has
already acted to implement the treaty through the United Nations
Participation Act.
If the President could issue an executive order or sue to enforce
any non-self-executing treaty without congressional authorization,
this would result in the transfer of power to implement every "nonself-execuiting" treaty to the discretion of the President, even if
Congress or the Senate had expressly intended to hold that power of
implementation to themselves. 10 Elsewhere I have argued that such a
transfer would raise separation of powers concerns about excessive
delegation.'
Here, the separation of powers limitation works in
tandem to protect federalism as well, because, as many nationalist
scholars have argued, Congress (or the Senate alone) has political
incentives to protect state autonomy.312 A strict application of the
non-self-execution doctrine, however, would avoid the excessive
delegation and federalism concerns by essentially leaving the power
to implement ICJ orders to the states.313
307. Vazquez, supra note 20, at 690.
308. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 681 (1981) (holding that the statutory
grant of Presidential authority to settle claims indicates "congressional acceptance of a
broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this case").
309. Id.
310. President Clinton took some limited steps to implement non-self-executing
treaties under his own constitutional authority. See Implementation of Human Rights
Treaties, Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68991, 68991 (Dec. 10, 1998) (instructing

"[a]ll executive departments and agencies... [to] maintain a current awareness of United
States international human rights obligations that are relevant to their functions and [to]
perform such functions so as to respect and implement those obligations fully."). Even
this very narrow assertion of presidential power over the non-self-executing human rights
treaties sparked criticism in Congress. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. E139-40 (daily ed. Feb.
4, 1999) (Extension of Remarks of Rep. Schaffer) (characterizing the executive order as
an attempt to circumvent the Senate in the implementation of "controversial U.N.
treaties").
311. See Ku, supra note 47, at 100-04 (arguing that ICJ provisional measures orders
could be subject to non-delegation doctrine attack).
312. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 11, at 1294-99; HENKIN, supra note 5, at 167-69.
313. Here, I borrow Professor Bradley's idea that the non-self-execution doctrine can
be understood as a mechanism for limiting delegations while not actually wielding the long
moribund non-delegation doctrine. Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the
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Of course, this does not resolve the policy dilemma caused by
leaving the states in control of what appear to be classic foreign policy
matters. Yet, as Part IV discusses, this policy dilemma is not so stark
as it first may appear. While it is true that states appear to hold
discretion over certain foreign policy questions in such circumstances,
the reason the states hold that power is because the foreign policy
question directly implicates a matter of state control. Consistent with
the federal government's practice with respect to tax immunities or
even VCCR violations, such state intervention in foreign policy issues
is tolerated because the interest in maintaining state authority over
such domestic matters outweighs the need for imposing a national
and international system.
The view that the President could either sue or simply order state
compliance with the ICJ orders is emblematic of the nationalist
conception of international law. Both of these theories of federal
power assume that states cannot (and should not) hold the last word
when it comes to an international obligation, especially an
international treaty obligation. In fact, Professor Vazquez charges
that the federal government's claims of powerlessness over the states
are "ill-founded and insincere," and declares unequivocally that "our
Constitution does not leave the decision whether to comply with ICJ
31 4
orders... to state Governors.
Yet, as this Article has already shown in the context of tax
immunity and alien inheritance rights, where Congress has declared a
treaty non-self-executing or otherwise limited its domestic effects,
states do control the decision of whether and how to comply with the
international obligation embodied in the ICJ orders, if only because
the federal government has allocated this role to them. Because the
ICJ Statute is non-self-executing, the decision to comply with ICJ
order does rest with state governors, as odd as that may seem. But in
a system where states commonly are responsible for carrying out

Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1557-60 (2003).

While I agree that most concerns about delegation concerns can be limited by such
measures, I continue to believe the non-delegation doctrine can provide a useful analytical
framework for assessing the transfer of power to international institutions because the
non-self execution doctrine depends to some great degree on the political branches'
willingness to utilize it. The non-delegation doctrine is the type of judicial safeguard that
can ensure compliance with constitutional structure as well as harness the legitimating
force of the courts to endorse and confirm our relationships with international institutions.
See Ku, supra note 47, at 135-44.

314. Vazquez, supra note 20, at 690-91; see also Halberstam, supra note 20, at 14-15
(arguing that the Constitution grants the federal government authority to require
compliance with ICJ judgments).
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international obligations on behalf of the United States, it would have
been extraordinary for the federal government to have acted
differently than it did. At the very least, federal officials' reluctance
to act against the states can hardly be denigrated as insincere.
D. InternationalHuman Rights Treaties
The last Section suggested that, according to the President, the
power to implement ICJ orders touching on matters within state
jurisdiction rests with the states. This Section argues that, according
to the Senate, states also independently control the implementation
of U.S. obligations under major international human rights treaties.
For instance, the Senate ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") was accompanied by a
declaration that:
The United States understands that this Covenant shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters
covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local
governments; to the extent that state and local governments
exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal
system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or
local governments may take appropriate measures for the
fulfillment of the Covenant.1 5
Similar understandings were attached to the ratification of two
other international human rights treaties3 16 to which the United States
is a party and have been proposed for two others still being
considered.3" 7 In addition to these understandings, the Senate has
315. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 102nd Cong., 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4784 (daily
ed. Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR Ratification].
316. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of Convention

Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 101st
Cong., 136 Cong. Rec. S17486, S17904 (Oct. 27, 1990)

(Pell & Helms Executive

Amendments); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to the Ratification of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 103rd
Cong., 145 Cong. Rec. S7634, S7634 (June 24, 1994) [hereinafter Racial Discrimination
Ratification].
317. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, REPORT RECOMMENDING RATIFICATION
OF THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 107-9 at 9, 12 (2002) (Sup. Doc. No. Y1.1/6: 107-9)
[hereinafter CEDAW Recommendation]; Message from the President of the United
States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 95-2,
C-F (Feb. 23, 1978) [hereinafter Carter Message] (recommending ratification of four
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attached "non-self-execution" declarations to each of these treaties
precluding judicial enforcement of these treaties.318
Read from the nationalist perspective, the federalism
understanding seems at best redundant because implementing the
ICCPR or other human rights treaties "to the extent of the federal
government's legislative and judicial jurisdiction" should not leave
any role for the states.3 19
As Professor Henkin states, the
understandings "serve no legal purpose" because the federal
government already exercises jurisdiction over all matters implicated
by the treaty, if for no other reason than because of the existence of
the treaty.32 °
To be sure, the legal purpose of the "understandings" is hardly
self-evident. Because they are not "reservations," they do not appear
to limit the United States' obligations under international law.321
Thus, they do not specifically limit the treaty obligations to asking for
state implementation in the same way as the so-called "federal-state"
clauses to treaties do.3 22 On the other hand, the understandings are
clearly conditions upon which ratification takes place and the federal
government has, at various times, suggested that it intends the
understandings to limit U.S. obligations under international law.
For instance, when submitting the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
("Torture Convention"), the State Department attached what it
called a "federal-state reservation" that would limit the scope of U.S.
treaties with federalism understandings, including International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.).
318. See CEDAW Recommendation, supra note 317, at 10-11; Carter Message, supra
note 317, at xv. These non-self executing declarations are controversial among scholars.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 401 n.4 (2000) (citing to scholarly criticism of non-self

executing declarations). Nonetheless, these declarations have thus far been enforced by
courts. See, e.g., Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1998) (giving effect to
ICCPR's non-self executing declarations).
319. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 345-46 (1995).
320. Id. at 346; see also Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the
Convention on the Eliminationof All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 31 G.W. J.

INT'L L. & ECON. 49, 59 (1997) (stating a federalism reservation is unnecessary).
321. See Henkin, supra note 319, at 346.
322. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
Nov. 23, 1972, art. 34(b), 27 U.S.T. 37, 49 (limiting obligations of federal states to
recommending that states implement legislation to comply with treaty obligations);
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. VI, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6227-28
(same); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, art. XI(b), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2521 (same); Constitution of the International
Labor Organization, Oct. 9, 1946, art. 19(9), 62 Stat. 3485, 3526 (same).
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obligations to implement the Convention.3 3 It further explained that
the United States would implement obligations to provide training of
persons involved in treatment of detained persons "with respect to
3 24
law enforcement forces acting under its authority or control.
However, with respect to state and local law enforcement forces, "the
Federal Government would take appropriate measures to the end
that the competent authorities of the states may take appropriate
measures for the fulfillment of [the Convention Articles]. 325
One reading of this far from pellucid language is that the federal
government's implementation, with respect to state and local law
enforcement, would be to the same "end" or extent as whatever
"appropriate measures" the states take to fulfill the Convention. This
implies that the federal government was asserting its right to take the
same "appropriate measures" that the states could take.
Such a reading is unlikely, however, given the stated purpose of
attaching this statement. This language originated in President
Carter's original submission of four treaties to the Senate.32 6 In that
submission, the State Department described the understanding as a
"reservation designed to deal with ... provisions ... which impose
obligations whose fulfillment is dependent on the legal power of the
3 27
state and local governments as well as the federal government.
In light of this history, the better reading is that the United
States' implementation at the state and local level would consist of
those implementation actions taken by the states. This second
reading is strengthened by Senator Helms's amendment to the
language, which modified the first clause to read that the "Federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system."
This amendment (and perhaps the well-known views of its sponsor as
well)3 28 strengthens the proposition that the federal government's
323. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. EXEC.
REP. No. 101-30, 13, 36 (Aug. 30, 1990) (Sup. Doc. No. Y1.1/6: 101-30).
324. Id. at 23.
325. Id.
326. See Carter Message, supra note 317, at vii.
327. Id. at viii.
328. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina served as Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee from 1994 to 2001 before retiring from the Senate. His skepticism of
international institutions and defense of what he called "American sovereignty" made him
the bete-noire of many internationalists and international law advocates. Prior to
becoming the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Helms was an
outspoken member of that same committee, at one point attaching a separate statement to
the committee report recommending ratification of the Genocide Convention filled with
criticisms of international institutions and their encroachment on American sovereignty.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

"appropriate measures" are limited by the "Federal System" to
whatever "appropriate measures" are taken by the states. The
modified "federalism understanding" language was also adopted with
respect to ratifications of the ICCPR and the Racial Discrimination
Convention.32 9
More recently, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report
recommending ratification of the Convention for the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") described the purpose
of a modified proposed federalism understanding in this way:
Although U.S. law does not proscribe the Federal Government
from committing its constituent units to the goal of nondiscrimination, U.S. law does provide limitations on the Federal
role in some areas. To reflect this situation, the administration
is proposing an understanding to make it clear that the United
States will carry out its obligations under the Convention in a
manner consistent with the Federal nature of its form of
government.33 °
The Report goes on to explain that federalization is not necessary to
implement certain parts of CEDAW affecting public education and
"[in some areas, it would be inappropriate to do so" where federal
control is "expressly limited by statute."33 '
Although the various statements from the Senate and the
President with regard to these understandings do not explicitly claim
that federal implementation would in some cases be unconstitutional,
they do state that the federal role is "limited" and that federalization
would be "inappropriate."3 3 2
Even though the Clinton
Administration's proposed federalism understanding removed
Senator Helms's "federal system" language,333 there is no reason to
See generally SEPARATE STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS, REPORT ON THE
CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, S.

EXEC. REP. No. 98-50 (1984) (Sup. Doc. No. Y1.1/6: 98-50).

329. See ICCPR Ratification, supra note 315, at S4783; Racial Discrimination
Ratification, supra note 316, at S7364.
OF
THE
SENATE
COMMITTEE
ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
330. REPORT
RECOMMENDING RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL

FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 103-38 at 7 (1994)

(Sup. Doc. No. Y1.1/6:103-38) [hereinafter CEDAW Report].
331. Idat 22.
332. Id.

333. In its last submission, the Clinton Administration modified the language of the last
sentence to read: "To the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction
over such matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures
Id. at 223 (describing federalism
to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention."
understanding proposed by Clinton administration).
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believe (especially in light of its response to the Breard ICJ orders)
that that administration did not believe the states are responsible for
implementing at least some parts of CEDAW.
Because the non-self-execution declarations preclude judicial
enforcement, this practice of conditioning ratification of treaties on
the attachment of federalism understandings leaves the states in
control of the implementation of international human rights
obligations.
Indeed, it is likely that the states retain some
independent jurisdiction with which the federal government cannot
interfere.
As mentioned previously, this idea of state implementation of
treaty obligations has been sharply criticized by scholars defending
the nationalist view.3 4 But as a practical matter, the "monstrous"
system Professor Golove so feared has already come to life. Whether
or not the federal government is constitutionally prohibited from
passing implementing legislation for international human rights
treaties against the states, the fact remains that no such implementing
legislation has been enacted or even proposed. Moreover, in many
that
treatymakers
specifically
contemplated
cases,
the
implementation would be carried out by the states. This decision has
thus left control of compliance with international human rights
obligations to the state governments.
This understanding sheds new light on Professor Vazquez's
aforementioned argument that federalism understandings violate the
ban on commandeering state officials announced in Printz v. United
States.335 A treaty would normally bind state officials under the
Supremacy Clause but for the treaty's non-self-execution reservation.
In these circumstances, the states have the independent authority to
implement internationallaw as internationallaw (but not international
law as federal law), a power which they have already exercised in the
implementation of tax immunities for consuls, the protection of
aliens, and consular rights.
Although Professor Vazquez believes that this view of the
understandings "is in deep tension with our constitutional scheme, '"336
because the federal government would not be able to prevent treaty
violations by the states,337 this Article has demonstrated that states
often hold broad discretion to incorporate and implement
334. See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text (describing views of Professors
Golove and Vazquez).
335. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
336. Vazquez, supra note 88, at 1358.
337. See id.at 1357-58.
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The fact that similar understandings
international obligations.
continue to be attached to proposed treaties338 suggests that the states
will maintain this central role in the future.
E.

Summary

In the modern era, states often implement U.S. obligations under
treaties state-by-state through the Uniform Laws system, through
independent adoption of legislation, or through independent action
by state executives. Such implementation has even preceded Senate
ratification resulting in some states "complying" with obligations that
the United States has not even undertaken.33 9 In other cases, the
states have essentially replaced Congress in the process of
implementing treaties. At the very least, states appear to supplement
gaps in self-executing treaties and implementing legislation.34 In the
context of international human rights, it is likely that the federal
government has specifically allocated this role to the states. In all of
these areas, the states, and not the federal government, have become
the key institutions for carrying out U.S. obligations under
international treaties.
These examples of state implementation of international
obligations, even those obligations required by self-executing treaties
that already held the status of supreme federal law, suggest that the
nationalist conception has seriously underestimated the importance
of states in the incorporation and implementation of international
law. States do not merely carry out international obligations as the
federal government commands. Instead they are independently
employing the power that has been allocated to them (or left to
them), which requires that they decide whether and how to comply
with international law obligations.
338. See CEDAW Report, supra note 330, at 9, 12.
339. See supra note 235 (listing states that adopted the Uniform International Wills Act

prior to Senate advice and consent).
340. Additionally, some states have adopted model legislation that itself was developed
by international institutions to harmonize and unify private law. For instance, five states
have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, and Texas). United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, pt. II, para. 10, at
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited Nov.10, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Similarly, forty-four states plus the District of Columbia enacted
the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act, which in some cases explicitly adopts the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. Id. at pt. II, para. 13. While such

actions do not create "international law", they do represent a new phenomenon:

the

states enacting legislation promulgated by international institutions without any federal
oversight or involvement.
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STATE CONTROL OVER INTERNATIONAL
LAW

This Article's primary goal has been to establish, as a descriptive
matter, the existence of a system of state control over international
law compliance. This Part, however, considers the implications of
such a system for the scholarly debate over the role of states in
foreign affairs and, more generally, for the development of
international law in the United States.
A.

More Than "One Voice"

As many scholars have pointed out, the Supreme Court has
stated on a number of occasions that it is necessary for the United
States to speak with one voice on matters involving foreign policy.341
Moreover, there is ample evidence that the founding generation
sought to prevent states from violating treaties and thereby inviting
foreign policy consequences for the nation as a whole.342
The longstanding existence of a system in which states control
compliance with various types of international law, however, suggests
that the U.S. system tolerates more voices, at least with respect to
international law, than either the Court's or Founders' statements
seem to indicate. Where international law intersects directly with
areas of traditional state control, the states have more often than not
been responsible for fulfilling those international obligations. The
federal government has not only failed to enforce "one voice" with
respect to many international law matters, but it has often explicitly
disclaimed an ability to do so.
Professor Spiro has argued that the increasing diversity of state
voices in foreign affairs indicates the rise of a new conception of
states on the world stage as "demi-sovereigns. ' 343 In his view, a
regime of federal exclusivity was contingent on the different social
344
and political imperatives of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The rise of globalization in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
341. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
342. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 15 (John Jay) (Jacob. E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("[U]nder the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of
nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner,whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in thirteen states... will not
always accord or be consistent ....); Jack N. Rakove, Making Foreign Policy-The View
from 1787, in FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1, 1-3 (Robert A. Goldwin &
Robert A. Licht, eds., 1990) (describing importance of creating uniform foreign policy
among Constitution's framers).
343. Spiro, supra note 26, at 161-74.
344. Id.; Spiro, supra note 68, at 1227-28.
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century and the increased complexity of cross-border interactions, he
has argued, has obviated the need for imposing "one voice" on
foreign relations law.345 Though the preceding description of state
control of international law compliance dovetails nicely with his
broader theory, this Article does not claim (as Spiro seems to suggest)
that the state-control system is historically contingent. Rather, this
account suggests that states have long played this role in compliance
with international law, even during the period of "federal exclusivity"
that Spiro believes existed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Nevertheless, it is probably true that the functional imperative
for "one voice" has probably been overstated. Not all foreign policy
questions are created equal. To be blunt, some matters of foreign
policy are simply more important than others. Adhering with one
voice to certain international obligations may simply not be as
important as maintaining a commitment to constitutional norms such
as federalism or separation of powers. The recognition that the
United States may sometimes prefer violating international law over
violating domestic law is embodied in doctrines such as the "last in
time" rule that permits Congress to abrogate a treaty with a statute
passed later in time3 46 and the Supreme Court's refusal to exempt
treaties from the Constitution.3 47
It is certainly not irrational for Congress and the President to
prefer a method of implementation that, while probably not perfect,
creates a balance between respecting state autonomy and fulfilling
international law obligations. Depending on the relative importance
of a particular international obligation, then, the federal government
could (as it has done in most cases) choose to leave the incorporation
and implementation of certain international obligations to the states
and even tolerate non-uniformity. This is essentially how the federal
government has chosen to implement most conventions in private
international law. Such a system is hardly radical or absurd. In fact,
it is essentially the same result as the system of treaty implementation
adopted by Canada.348
Additionally, in some cases, state institutions may be the most
effective mechanisms for achieving compliance with different types of
international obligations. State legislation, for instance, may be a
345. Spiro, supra note 26, at 161-74; Spiro, supra note 68, at 1225-28.
346. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,194 (1888).
347. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1957) (plurality opinion).
348. See JAMES MCLEOD HENDRY, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 122-

27 (1975) (describing Privy Council's decision limiting power of central government to
implement treaty against the provinces).
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more practical and effective mechanism than new federal legislation
for implementing obligations to guarantee statutory notice in probate
proceedings or exempting consuls from property taxes.349 Indeed,
international treaty obligations are already being implemented by
some states, even prior to ratification, through the uniform law
system. There is no reason to believe that this "private lawmaking"
system cannot be used to implement compliance with international
obligations."' As the State Department's foray into state-by-state
lobbying to win exemptions in gasoline taxes suggests, such a process
would not be unprecedented either.
B.

Development of InternationalLaw

Supporters of the nationalist conception have also suggested that
leaving international law implementation to the states would
complicate and even weaken adherence to international law.351 As an
empirical matter, it is an open question whether the existing regime
actually prevents the United States from adhering to international
law. In fact, the leading work in this vein has failed to reveal any
meaningful difference between U.S. and European compliance with
international human rights treaties.352 As this Article's account
suggests, states have largely acted to implement international law
obligations without the threat of federal intervention, and there is no
evidence to suggest the United States is more of an international law
scofflaw than other nations due to its federal system. 3 Indeed, the
usage of the uniform laws system to implement treaty obligations will
likely ensure that adherence to international law obligations will be
no less remarkable than states' adherence to the Uniform
349. See supra notes 127-74 and accompanying text.
350. Or, as Professor Swaine has suggested, certain states could be authorized to enter
into compacts with foreign nations, thus permitting federalism concerns to be respected
while allowing those states wishing to enter into international agreements to do so. See
Edward Swaine, Can Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403,

447-49 (2003).

While such a method is certainly a creative solution to the federalism

dilemma, my understanding is that this process could already occur because states could

adopt laws that entitle them to reciprocity from foreign jurisdictions even in the absence of
a treaty or compact. See supra notes 221-37 and accompanying text (discussing the
Washington Convention).
351. See supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
352. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L. J. 1935, app. at 2034-39 (2002) (presenting data which suggests that U.S. compliance

with certain human rights treaties is similar to other industrialized countries and
significantly better than many other countries).
353. Indeed, as pointed out previously, Canada, often a leading proponent of
international law compliance, has adhered to a system of province by province treaty
implementation. See HENDRY, supra note 348, at 122-27.
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Commercial Code.
A system of state control over the implementation of
international law obligations strikes a balance between the
development of international law and our constitutional commitment
to federalism. At least in the treaty-making context, the Senate's
commitment to preserve a role for the states in the implementation of
treaties may be necessary for American adherence. 4 Given the
substantial political influence of the countermajoritarian Senate in
foreign affairs, maintaining a circumscribed federal role in the
implementation of international law obligations may well increase the
likelihood of the adoption of international law norms in at least some
parts of the United States."'
Finally, as some scholars have suggested, a robust and active role
for states in the international lawmaking sphere may actually foster
more rather than less development of international law, especially
customary international law.35 a On this view, states can contribute to
the formation of customary international law norms by fulfilling
international law obligations which the federal government has not
yet endorsed. Such actions by the states can spread upward to the
federal government or across borders to other states or nations, thus
contributing to the "formation" of customary international law. In
Professor Powell's conception, states can thus participate in a
"dialogic federalism" process that she suggests will bolster and
strengthen international law norms. 7
C.

Bolstering Legitimacy for the New InternationalLaw

As scholars have noted elsewhere, much of the future conflict
between federalism and international law will arise because of a
"new" type of international law that regulates a nation-state's
interactions with its own nationals.35 8 This new international law,
much of it embodied in modern international human rights
conventions and private international law, is more likely to intersect
with the autonomy of the several states than traditional international

354. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 457-67 (arguing that RUDs may
facilitate greater U.S. participation in human rights treaty regimes).
355. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 29, at 289-90.
356. Powell, supra note 30, at 250-51.
357. Id.
358. See Ku, supra note 47, at 83-88; Paul B. Stephan, The New International LawLegitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (describing a new international law regulating relations
between nation states and their own citizens).
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law, which dealt mostly with state-to-state relations. 359
In fact, the increased likelihood that international law will
conflict with domestic law actually increases the importance of
adhering to constitutional constraints. International law that has the
effect of overriding domestic law, which in the United States will
often be state law, needs the most solid foundation of political
legitimacy possible. Therefore, aggressive judicial review to enforce
these constitutional constraints, which may implicate separation of
powers, individual rights, and federalism concerns, is an important
element of building that foundation of political legitimacy.36 °
Unfortunately, the nationalist conception often deprives international
law of that solid foundation by insisting that federal institutions
exercise broad, constitutionally-suspect power over the states. In
light of this Article's account of the historical practice of the federal
government with respect to international obligations implicating state
autonomy, it is not surprising that, even today, the federal
government refuses to exercise what many nationalist scholars believe
are basic and uncontroversial powers. As the United States declared
before the International Court of Justice with respect to claims about
the federal government's powers to stop a state execution:
In a government that operates under the rule of law, the chief
executive is not asked to sign orders of any kind without careful
preparation and research to ensure that the order is legally
authorized and sound. An Executive order to a state governor
to stay an execution would have been unprecedented and
fraught with legal uncertainty.36 1
Indeed, this Article's account of the interaction between federal
and state decisionmakers in the international law-making process
suggests that federal policymakers have restrained themselves
because of doubt about the constitutional legitimacy of the nationalist
view of international law. 362 These concerns are even greater in the
context of the "new" international law, which has the potential to
reshape more state law than the "old" international law interventions
on behalf of consuls and aliens could have ever imposed.
By leaving much of the incorporation, implementation, and
359. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 396-98.

360. Id. at 394.
361. LaGrand U.S. Counter-Memorial, supra note 18, para. 125.
362. Avena Thessin Statement, supra note 282, at paras. 3.43-3.44 (arguing that the ICJ
was seeking to force the federal government to "test the limits" of its authority over the

states).
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execution of international law to the states, the federal government
can confer the greatest amount of political legitimacy on the new
international law. Rather than international law imposed from above
through questionable constitutional mechanisms, international law
can be "made" in a manner free from constitutional doubt-by the
states.
CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court has suggested states do not "exist"
with respect to foreign affairs, this Article has suggested that, at least
with respect to international law, the states remain alive and well. A
review of the practice of the United States with respect to customary
international law and treaty obligations reveals that the states have
controlled the
implementation of many
important U.S.
responsibilities under international law.
The continuing importance of the states is confirmed by the
federal government's recent interaction with the International Court
of Justice in disputes over the provision of consular notification rights
to arrested foreign nationals and the federal government's use of the
uniform laws system to implement private international law treaties.
Whether or not the nationalist conception prevails as a matter of
constitutional doctrine, the states will almost certainly maintain their
important role in the system for carrying out U.S. obligations under
international law.
This system limits fears of unchecked international lawmaking
power by permitting the United States to participate in the
development of international law while at the same time protecting
state autonomy.
In this system, customary international law
obligations implicating state law that are not codified by treaty or
statute are left to the states to fulfill. Additionally, compliance with
relevant non-self-executing treaties or self-executing treaties whose
effect has been limited by other federal law, is held by the states.
Recognition of this flexible federalism-friendly system for
compliance with international law may actually encourage more,
rather than less, U.S. participation in the development of
international law because states can actually contribute to the
formation of customary international law norms. At the very least,
resort to this system of state control will confer greater political
legitimacy on such law than the nationalist conception can provide.
Hence, for the foreseeable future, the State of New York (as well
as the other forty-nine states) will continue to exist, and indeed
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thrive, as part of the system for fulfilling international law obligations
within the United States. The task for courts and commentators is
first to recognize the importance of states in this process and then to
move toward considerations of how best to accommodate the
development of international law to this constitutional reality.
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